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Abstract	  
 
Capital structure in shipping has proven to be complex.  The market is known for high 
volatility and the financial funding alternatives have changed as a result of these 
cycles.   
 
This master thesis introduces the shipping market with focus on the dry bulk and 
tanker segments.  It then discusses capital structure theory and relates it to shipping.  
These theories form the basis of the analysis.  Evaluating the segments does not give a 
clear answer to the best way of financing given the market conditions.  However, it 
seems like the industry prefer owning vessels instead of leasing and the average debt-
equity market ratios have been quite low and stable between 2005 and 2010.  Both 
segments have experienced a reduction of ROE and ROIC to approximately the same 
values as in 2002.  The expected increase in fleet size implies that calmer seas will not 
be reached in the near future.   
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1. Introduction 
 
In this master thesis, I have studied capital structure in the shipping industry.  I first 
introduce the industry and two of its main segments in chapter 2.  Theories related to 
capital structure are then presented and discussed in chapter 3, before they are 
connected to shipping in chapter 4.  I have in chapter 5 and 6 studied different types 
of funding and some affecting variables.  The last part of this thesis examines 
financial- and market data, with the purpose of finding relations.  In addition, I 
wanted to study whether or not the companies had the same reactions to changes in 
the market conditions.   
 
The dataset consist of 24 shipping companies, divided into 11 dry bulk- and 13 tanker 
companies.  A list of the companies is found in Appendix C.  I have decided to 
examine these segments, as they have several similarities and therefore are influenced 
by many of the same market variables.  Studying additional segments would increase 
the number of variables, and thereby make it more difficult to compare.   
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2. Shipping market 
 
“Shipping is a cheap source of transport which can open up wider markets to 
specialisation, offering shipment of even the most everyday products at prices far 
below those that can be achieved by any other means” (Smith, 1776, referred to by 
Kavussanos and Marcoulis, 2005, pp. 107).   
 
Seaborne trade has existed for several thousand years.  The world has been discovered 
and conquered by the means of ships in various shapes and forms throughout the 
centuries.  This has increased the demand for transportation of goods and merchandise 
over large distances.   The possibilities of moving large volumes of cargo made the 
maritime industry ideal.  Today, international shipping is responsible for transporting 
approximately 90% of the world’s cargo (Shipping Facts).  The increase in the world 
seaborne trade is illustrated by graph 1.  It shows how the world’s seaborne trade, 
measured in tonne miles, has developed from 1962 to 2010.  Tonne mile is a 
measurement used in shipping and can be defined as the tonnage of cargo shipped 
multiplied with the distance it is shipped.   
 
After the industrial revolution and through the nineteenth century steel vessels with 
steam engines replaced sailing ships made of wood.  This development was the 
foundation of the diversifications found in the maritime industry throughout the last 
couple of decades.  Today, most shipping companies tend to operate within one 
market segment.  However, an investor often owns firms in different markets, making 
it possible to combine specialization with diversification.  The tradition of privately 
owned family companies are today partly replaced by companies listed on the stock 
exchanges, as the industry has become more capital intensive.  
	   3	  
 
Graph 1: World seaborne trade in billion tonne miles from 1962 to 2010 (Fearnleys).  Graph 1 
illustrates the total amount of cargo shipped, divided into different types of cargoes.  The large increase 
during the 1970s was due to the conflicts in the Middle East and the closure of the Suez Canal.   
 
Transporting 90% of the world’s cargoes make shipping an industry exposed to the 
world economy and stability.  This gives markets cycles, as shown by graph 2 and 
graph 3 on the next page.  Each cycle last, according to Martin Stopford (2009), eight 
years if the last fifty years are used as basis.  None are similar in either length or 
seriousness.  Therefore, predicting the market can be a challenge for all parties 
involved.  In addition, high level of standardisation leads to many participants.  This 
results in a market with almost perfect competition.  Significant exposure to the 
world’s economy, combined with the level of competitors, creates a highly volatile 
industry.   
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Graph 2: Tanker freight rates in Worldscale between 1972 and 04.06.2011 (Fearnleys).  The graph 
illustrates the volatility in freight rates for VLCCs loading in the Middle East Gulf and discharging in 
the U.S. Gulf, Canada or Europe.  This voyage is representative for the development in the crude oil 
freight rates.  The peak in the early 1970s was a result of the conflicts in the Middle East, where among 
other things the Suez Canal was closed.    
 
 
Graph 3: Baltic Dry Index between 1985 and 04.06.2011 (Fearnleys).  The graph illustrates the 
development and volatility in the dry bulk shipping market.  BDI is based on different shipbrokers view 
of the current freight costs and reported to the Baltic Exchange every working day.   
 
 
2.1. Currency 
 
A large business like shipping tends to favour the use of one currency in transactions.  
As most international markets, the standard currency is the US Dollar (USD).  Other 
currencies can be used, but USD seems to be preferred in the daily trade.  There are 
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several advantages by using one major currency in daily trade which all parties 
involved are familiar with.  Key points as exchange rates and liquidity in international 
markets are vital issues when otherwise complicated agreements are worked out.  
Using one currency removes the risk related to exchange rates as revenues and 
expenses are paid and received in the same currency.   
 
 
2.2. Structure of the business 
 
The Shipping industry can roughly be divided into charterers, shipbrokers, 
shipbuilders and ship-owners.   As this master thesis focuses on capital structure, 
ship-owners are the most relevant and are briefly introduced below.  
 
2.2.1. Ship-owners 
A widely used technique in the United Kingdom some 150 years ago was to register 
each vessel as 64 shares, with the option to attract different investors (Stopford, 
2009).  The majority of ships were privately owned, but joint stock partnership took 
over as vessels grew in size and became more expensive.  This way of organizing a 
company protected the investors from the company’s creditors.   
 
Even though the companies had public financing, those allowed to invest were strictly 
controlled.  Cash flow or borrowings were still primarily used to finance new 
investments.  This structure changed during the middle of the twentieth century, as 
charterers required larger and more specialized vessels.  In return ship-owners got 
long time charter contracts.  This gave the opportunity to reduce the level of equity 
when investing in new vessels.  As demand changed and financing turned towards 
charter-backed and asset-backed, new ways of structuring the corporations were 
developed.  One example is the one-vessel company, where the vessels in a ship-
owning firm were registered as individual companies.  This provided the opportunity 
to finance each ship separately, giving banks mortgage on both hull and contracts.  
Owners then got the option to use different flag states for each vessel, choosing the 
one most suitable.  Financial or operational problems would then be isolated and only 
affect the involved vessels.  
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2.3. Contracts 
 
Today, vessels transport cargoes based on different types of charter parties1.  It is 
normal to distinguish between the spot- and long term market, which consist of bare 
boat charter and time charter.  The use of the different alternatives varies between the 
four strategic types of shipping (figure 1).   
 
2.3.1. Spot market 
In the spot market, each voyage is negotiated individually.  This means that the same 
voyage with the same cargo can be priced differently.  Fixing a vessel in the spot 
market makes the charterer responsible for supplying the cargo, while the ship-owner 
is responsible for providing the vessel and carry out loading, transportation and 
discharging within the agreed timeframe. 
 
2.3.2. Bare boat market 
A bare boat charter gives the charterer the possibility to lease a vessel and have full 
operational responsibility.  The charterer is then responsible for both operating costs 
like maintenance and crew wages, and commercial operation cost like voyage costs 
and cargo handling costs.  The time frame of a contract is often between 10 and 20 
years.   
 
2.3.3. Time charter market 
Time charter is an agreement to lease a vessel without having the operational 
responsibility.  The charterer pays the owner a predetermined fixed daily rate, called 
the time charter equivalent (TCE).  Owner of the vessel is then responsible for the 
operating costs, while charterer pays commercial operation costs.   The time frame is 
normally shorter than bare boat charters and can vary from one voyage to several 
years.     
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A	  charter	  party	  is	  the	  contract	  setting	  out	  terms	  and	  details	  of	  a	  fixture.	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2.4. Segments 
 
The shipping market consists of many different segments, simplistically divided into 
two categories, the bulk and the liner markets (Cullinane, 2005).  Figure 1 describes 
the four different strategic types of shipping and graph 4 shows the development in 
the world trade, measured in metric tonne, from 1962 to 2010.  This thesis focuses on 
the bulk market, divided into dry bulk and tank, as they are responsible for 
transporting a significant part of the world’s seaborne trade.  The two markets are 
primarily to be found in the commodity and contract sectors in figure 1.  Bulk 
shipping can be characterized as “one ship – one cargo” (Kavussanos and Marcoulis, 
2005, pp. 108) as vessels handle fewer, but significantly larger cargoes than those 
operating in liner shipping.   
 
 
Figure 1: Strategic types of shipping (Wijnolst and Wergeland, 2008).  The table divides the shipping 
industry into four sectors and briefly define these.  The part of the tanker market transporting oil is to 
be found in the commodity sector, while chemicals and gas are found in both the contract and industry 
sectors.  Large dry bulk is located in the commodity sector, while handy bulk lies somewhere between 
the commodity and contract sectors.   
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Graph 4: The world’s seaborne trade in million metric tonne (Fearnleys).  The graph illustrates the 
total amount of cargo shipped divided into different types of cargoes. 
 
2.4.1. Tanker market 
The market for transportation of oil can be divided into two main segments such as 
crude oil and refined products.  Refined products can then be split into clean and dirty 
products.  Clean products are refined petroleum products like gasoline, naphtha and 
diesel, while dirty primarily is fuel oil.  Chemicals and gas (LNG/LPG) are also 
important tanker markets.  The vessels used vary in size, depending on cargo and 
volume.  It has however been a clear trend to move larger lots to decrease the cost per 
tonne transported.   
 
 
Table 1: Different types of tanker vessels2 (Fearnleys). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  VLCC	  is	  used	  to	  define	  all	  vessels	  above	  200,000	  dwt.	  	  As	  of	  today,	  only	  a	  few	  vessels	  traded	  in	  the	  spot	  market	  can	  be	  classified	  as	  ULCC	  (a	  previously	  used	  category	  for	  vessels	  above	  320’	  dwt).	  	  This	  is	  the	  TI	  Oceania	  (442’	  dwt)	  owned	  by	  Overseas	  Shipholding	  Group	  Inc.	  (OSG)	  and	  TI	  Europa	  (442’	  dwt)	  owned	  by	  Euronav.	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Transporting oil includes an environmental risk, although very small compared to the 
volume moved.  A few major disasters, such as Exxon Valdez in 1989 and Prestige in 
2002, created serious pollution problems.  In both incidents persisted oil such as crude 
oil and fuel oil were involved, which makes the pollution more severe.  In an attempt 
to reduce risk, new tankers with double hull have been designed.  These have been 
constructed since the early 1990’s and single hull tankers will have to be phased out 
latest by the end of 2015 (Fearnleys).  
 
2.4.1.1. Contract 
Tankers can be chartered either on a voyage basis in the spot market, or on time 
charter.  The freight rate in the spot market is determined by the Worldscale system or 
as a lump sum in USD, while time charter uses a time charter equivalent (TCE).  This 
is a daily rate measured in USD.  Worldscale calculates the cost of freight as shown 
by equation 1.   
 !"#$  !"#  !"#$%ℎ! = !"#$  !"  !"#$% ⋅ !"#$ ⋅ !"#$  !"#$100  
Equation 1: Worldscale formula. 
 
Worldscale Association decides and publishes the flat rate once a year through a book 
and the Internet.  This value, called the flat rate, shows the cost per metric tonne for a 
round trip performed by a standard vessel3 between two ports.  The flat rate is set to 
be 100%.  Size of cargo is the volume to be transported.  The rate is a variable and 
decided by the market.  It is measured in per cent of the flat rate and is negotiated 
individually for every cargo, making it highly volatile.  Using the Worldscale system 
provides the possibility to compare revenues for various types of vessels sailing 
different routes, and thereby determine the most profitable voyages.  Tanker freight 
rates in the spot market are referred to as Worldscale or just WS.   
 
The TCE can be found by restructuring the Worldscale lump sum freight equation.  
Typical maturities in the TCE market are 12 months, 5 years and 10 years (C.R. 
Weber), but any period can be negotiated.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  A	  standard	  vessel	  is	  set	  to	  be	  75’	  dwt.	  operating	  with	  a	  service	  speed	  of	  14.5	  knots.	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 !"# = !"#$  !"#  !"#$%ℎ! − !"#$%&  !"#$#!"#$%&  !"#$  !"#$%&!"'  !"##"$%, !"#$%&'  !"#  !"#$ℎ!"#$%# 
Equation 2: Time charter equivalent in the tanker market (Stopford, 2009). 
 
2.4.1.2. Market today 
The tanker market reached a peak in the first half of 2008, before the world economy 
affected by the financial crisis triggered a downturn in the shipping market.  Large 
ordering of new vessels during this decade, with delivery in the following years, 
created a significant oversupply of tonnage (table 2).  Even though contracts were 
cancelled, more ships have been added than demolished, contributing to the low rates 
found in the market today.  The existing fleet will by the end of 2014 have grown with 
18% if today’s fleet are kept constant and all vessels on order are delivered.  Freight 
rates can be expected to stay low as long as the oversupply of tonnage continues to 
influence the market.  The high supply will continue to keep the utilization rate down, 
as shown by graph 14 in Appendix B.    
 
 
Table 2: Tanker fleet profile as end of April 20114 (Fearnresearch Bulk fleet update, April 2011).  
The table provides an overview of existing vessels and those to be delivered between 2011 and 2014.   
 
2.4.2. Dry bulk market 
Dry bulk covers a wide range of cargoes like coal, iron ore, cement fertilise and grain.  
These cargoes have one thing in common; they are all shipped in large volume.   
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Table 3 defines the size of the different vessels used.  A dry bulk vessel can load and 
discharge most places in the world, as it does not require the same specialized cargo-
handling terminals as a tanker.  It is also easier and less costly for a dry bulk vessel to 
switch between different types of cargoes. 
 
 
Table 3: Different types of dry bulk vessels (Fearnresearch Dry bulk market report, April 2004). 
 
2.4.2.1. Contracts 
Cargoes and vessels can, as the tanker market, be traded in the spot and time charter 
market.  The freight rate is given as either USD/day or USD/tonne.  Rates as USD/day 
are calculated almost the same way as the TCE in the tanker market.  Equation 3 
illustrates the modified formula.    
 !"# = !"#$% ⋅ !"#/!"##$ − !"#$%&  !"#$#!"#$%&  !"#$  !"#$%&!"'  !"##"$%, !"#$%&'  !"#  !"#$ℎ!"#$%# 
Equation 3: Time charter equivalent in the dry bulk market (Stopford, 2009). 
 
In dry bulk, time charter is used frequently and often to price individual voyages.  
This is related to the absence of a spot freight rate system like Worldscale.  It is not 
possible to create such system, as it exists too many possible ports able for loading 
and discharging.  Instead, time charter is used.  The charter party then define the areas 
for which the vessel should be loading and discharging.   
 
2.4.2.2. Market today 
The dry bulk market has, as the tanker market, struggled with oversupply of tonnage 
the last couple of years.  During the first quarter of 2011, the dry bulk fleet grew with 
approximately 4% (RS Platou monthly report, April 2011).  This growth is still 
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affected by the ordering of vessels done before the top of the cycle in 2008.  As 
shown by graph 15 in Appendix B, the utilization in dry bulk peaked that year with a 
rate close to 1.  The financial crisis reduced the activity in the world economy, and 
decreased the demand for natural resources and other dry bulk cargoes.  This 
generated a downturn in the market.   
 
Demand for dry bulk tonnage is expected to increase in the coming years, but the 
large order book indicates prolonged troubles (RS Platou monthly report, April 2011).  
In other words, the increase in demand is not high enough to cover the growth of 
tonnage.  This problem is illustrated by table 4, which shows the deliveries of vessels 
between 2011 and 2014.  The number of vessels on order will create an increase in the 
existing fleet by 34%, if the current fleet is kept constant.   
 
 
Table 4: Dry bulk fleet profile as end of April 2011 (Fearnresearch Bulk fleet update, April 2011).  
The table provides an overview of existing vessels and those to be delivered between 2011 and 2014. 
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3. Theory - Capital structure 
 
“The leading theories of capital structure attempt to explain the proportions of debt 
and equity observed on the right- hand side of corporations’ balance sheets” (Myers, 
2002, pp. 217).   
 
The composition of capital structure depends on several external and internal factors, 
like the line of business, economic conditions, and the firm’s strategy.  Firms with 
low credit rating tend to have a multi-tiered capital structure consisting of different 
types of debt, while higher rated firms use fewer layers (Rauh and Sufi, 2010).  The 
following chapter will go into theory relevant to this master thesis.   
 
 
3.1. Modigliani-Miller theorem 
 
Developed by Modigliani and Miller (1958), the theorem forms a fundament of 
modern business finance theory.  It states that the market value of any firm is constant 
and independent of its capital structure.  The level of debt, the gearing-ratio, does not 
influence the value because investors can create and remove leverage privately.  This 
is possible since Modigliani and Miller (1958) assume that investors and firms have 
access to the same financial markets.   
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) present two propositions: 
 
Proposition I: “The average cost of capital to any firm is completely independent of 
its capital structure and is equal to the capitalization rate of a pure equity stream of 
its class” (Modigliani and Miller, 1958, pp. 268-269). 
 
Proposition II: “The expected yield of a share of stock is equal to the appropriate 
capitalization rate for a pure equity stream in the class, plus a premium related to 
financial risk equal to the debt-to-equity ratio times the spread between the 
capitalization rate and rate of interest” (Modigliani and Miller, 1958, pp. 271). 
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The value of a firm is influenced by risk and other variables like market conditions.  
In order to test proposition I, these effects need to be adjusted for.  Proposition I can 
be written as the weighted average cost of capital before tax (WACC), with rD and rE 
as the cost of debt and cost of equity.  D, E and V are then debt, equity and total 
value.  This equation can be rewritten and give proposition II.   
 
Proposition I:  !"## = !! = !! !! + !! !! 
Equation 4: Proposition I (Myers, 2002).  
  
Proposition II:  !! = !! + !! − !! !! 
Equation 5: Proposition II (Myers, 2002).  
 
When cheap debt is used as a substitute for expensive equity, the remaining equity 
gets more expensive.  This is shown by proposition II. 
   
The Modigliani-Miller theorem became the basis for much research and was proven 
not to hold under a variety of circumstances.  Frank and Goyal (2007) state some of 
the most common elements as consideration of taxes, transaction costs, bankruptcy 
costs, agency conflicts, adverse selection, lack of separability between financing and 
operations, time-varying financial market opportunities and investor clientele effects.   
 
In 1963, Modigliani and Miller published a correction of their original article, due to 
an error in their “discussion of the effects of the present method of taxing corporations 
on the valuation of firms” (Modigliani and Miller, 1963, pp. 433).  One of the 
assumptions in Modigliani and Miller (1958) was the dividing of firms into classes.  
Each class consist of firms with equivalent returns, i.e. return on shares issued by one 
firm is proportional and correlate with return from other firms in the same class.  They 
write: “the market values of firms in each class must be proportional in equilibrium 
to their expected returns net of taxes (that is, to the sum of the interest paid and 
expected net stockholder income)” (Modigliani and Miller, 1963, pp. 434).  A firm 
with higher expected return after tax than other firms in the same class should always 
have a higher return and the difference between the returns has to be constant.  This 
statement was proven wrong and rewritten in their correction in 1963.  Arbitrage 
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cannot be obtained from just expected after tax return, it also depend on tax rate and 
leverage ratio.  The tax advantage of debt financing was therefore proven to be greater 
than expected in Modigliani and Miller (1958).   
 
 
3.2. The trade-off theory 
 
The trade-off theory can be divided into two categories, static and dynamic, and is a 
result of the debate following Modigliani-Miller proposition I and Modigliani and 
Miller (1963).  This correction, as mentioned above, increases the tax advantages of 
debt compared to using equity.  However, according to Frank and Goyal (2008), the 
new version did not create any offsetting cost of debt.  This gives an optimal level of 
debt equal to 100% of the required financing.  Trade-off theory was developed to 
provide an intersection between tax benefits of debt and deadweight cost of 
bankruptcy.  Modigliani-Miller proposition I can, based on trade-off theory, be 
rewritten as equation 6 (Myers, 2002). 
 ! = ! + ! = ! + !" !"#$%$&#  !"#  !ℎ!"#$% − !" !"#$  !"  !"#$#%"$&  !"#$%&##  
Equation 6: Rewriting of proposition I (Myers, 2002).  
 ! is the firm value when only equity is used, PV(interest tax shields) is present value 
of future tax saved due to interest tax deduction and PV(cost of financial distress) is 
the present value of future costs related to distress.  Optimal value (V) is given when 
PV(interest tax shields) is offset by PV(cost of financial distress).  Therefore, the level 
of debt is increased until the point where the optimal value is reached.   
 
How management handles the combination of debt and equity might form the basis of 
conflicts between creditors and shareholders and generate agency costs.  A common 
share is equivalent to a call option on a firm’s asset and the exercise price is similar to 
the face value of the outstanding debt (Black and Scholes, 1973).  A decrease in the 
value of the debt will then give shareholders a gain.  Management can, based on this 
relation, choose to favour their shareholders by transferring values from creditors.  If 
the level of risk increases, the value of existing debt will decrease.  This is also a fact 
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if the level of debt is increased in order to pay dividend.  Management can reduce the 
amount of investments financed by equity.  The market value of existing debt 
increases with equity-financed investments, since creditors obtain better protection as 
the value of tangible assets increase.  This change in value can be looked upon as a 
tax and thereby discourage investments.  Instead, it can act as an incentive to pay 
dividend.  Myers (1977) addresses this as the debt overhang problem.  Creditors try to 
oppose this displacement of value by writing restrictive debt contracts, with covenants 
controlling the possibilities of additional borrowings and dividend payouts.   
 
3.2.1. Static trade-off theory 
Myers (1984) defines the static theory as “setting a target debt-to-value ratio and 
then gradually moving towards it” (Myers, 1984, pp. 576).  
 
Optimal debt ratio is a combination of benefits and costs related to borrowing.  The 
time period for the trade-off must be, according to Frank and Goyal (2007), one single 
period.  This includes balancing debt tax shields against the cost of bankruptcy.  
Equity is substituted by debt and the opposite way around until the maximal value of 
the firm is reached (Myers, 1984).  He illustrates this with graph 5.    
 
 
Graph 5: The static trade-off theory of capital structure (Myers, 1984).  The figure shows the 
balance between interest tax shields and cost of financial distress.  A firm will substitute debt for equity 
and the other way around until the value of the firm is maximized.    
	   17	  
3.2.1.1. Cost of adjustments 
Without cost of adjustments, the optimal debt ratio would be the observed debt-to-
value ratio.  However, the presence of adjustment costs and fluctuation between firms 
creates a spread in debt-ratios across business sectors.   
 
3.2.1.2. Debt and taxes 
In the static trade-off theory, the tax structure has to be modified in order to fit the 
model (Bradley, Jarrel and Kim, 1984).  This is necessary since most taxation systems 
depend on more than one period.   Further, Bradley, Jarrel and Kim (1984) assume: 
 -­‐ Investors are risk-neutral. -­‐ Investors face a progressive tax rate on returns from bonds. -­‐ As corporate taxation, investors face taxes based on end-of period wealth. -­‐ Dividends and capital gains have a constant tax rate. -­‐ Non-debt tax shields exist. -­‐ The corporation will incur cost related to financial distress if failing to pay 
required end-off period payments. -­‐ If failing to meet required payments, costs related to financial distress will 
reduce the value of the firm. 
 
Combining equity and debt creates an optimizing problem. What level of debt is 
maximizing the value of the firm?  The answer can be either an interior point or on a 
boundary (Frank and Goyal, 2007).  Bradley, Jarrel and Kim (1984) created a formula 
based on the assumptions mentioned above.  If the optimal solution is interior, the 
formula will calculate the highest market value of the firm.   
 
 
Equation 7: Optimal value of a firm (Bradley, Jarrel and Kim, 1984). 
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Table 5: Description of terms used and main predictions in Equation 7.   
 
Equation 7 can be divided into three expressions; explaining marginal net tax benefit 
of debt, probability of wasting net debt tax shields and marginal increase in expected 
costs of distress (Frank and Goyal, 2007).  Contrary to the Miller capital structure 
irrelevance model (Miller 1977), equation 7 assumes a personal tax on income from 
stocks and leverage-related costs.   
 
3.2.1.3. Cost of financial distress 
Bankruptcy costs are, together with moral hazard, monitoring- and contracting costs, a 
part of costs related to financial distress and can severely reduce the value of a firm.  
The literature discussing the cost of financial distress forms two statements about 
financing.  
 
“Risky firms ought to borrow less, other things equal” (Myers, 1984, pp. 581).  Risk 
is defined as the variance in market value of a firm’s assets.  The probability of 
default increases as the variance raises.  Less risky firms should therefore be able to 
borrow more before the tax advantage of debt is offset by expected cost of financial 
distress.   
 
“Firms holding tangible assets-in-place having active second-hand markets will 
borrow less than firms holding specialized, intangible assets or valuable growth 
opportunities” (Myers, 1984, pp. 581).  In order to find the expected financial cost of 
distress, the probability of getting into financial difficulties must be combined with 
the value lost if the firm gets in trouble.   
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3.2.1.4. Discussion 
Myers definition and explanation of the trade-off theory raise questions for 
discussion.  Frank and Goyal (2007) argue that a target debt-to-value ratio is not 
directly observable.  Further, the tax code is said to be more complex than assumed by 
Myers (1984) and bankruptcy cost must be a deadweight cost.  In addition, transaction 
costs need to increase gradually and not abrupt (Leary and Roberts, 2005).     
 
Equation 7 (Bradley, Jarrel and Kim, 1984) contains elements difficult to measure, 
which makes the use of proxies necessary.  This can create problems when using the 
model and raise questions like whether the finding is a result of the proxy or the 
theory.  In addition, the equation does not include retained earnings, since it is a one 
period model.  In real life, firms tend to keep some of their earnings.  Retained 
earnings can be defined as equity and is generated by all profitable firms (Frank and 
Goyal, 2007).  Forming a theory means taking assumptions and make simplifications.  
Not including retained earnings as an individual factor is an example of this.   
 
The static trade-off model gives only the option to use the optimal level of debt.  This, 
together with assumptions mentioned above, has been important in the view of the 
trade-off theory since the 1980s.   
 
3.2.2. Dynamic trade-off theory 
“The dynamic models contain features that allow the trade-off theory to provide a 
better account of how firms finance their operations than had been previously 
thought” (Frank and Goyal, 2007, pp. 146).  Unlike the static trade-off theory, a 
dynamic theory contains multiple periods.  This makes it possible to include 
adjustment costs and expectations for the future.  Dividend payments and raising 
funds exemplify actions that might take place in a future period.  Whether they take 
place today or later, depend on expected development in the economy.  This raise 
questions like when is it most profitable to pay dividend or raise money.  A 
company’s tax rate and rate of return must be compared to tax on dividend and rate of 
return required by the shareholders (Frank and Goyal, 2007).  This suggests that 
profitable companies, with higher rate of return than its shareholders, should retain 
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more than a less profitable firm.   When earnings are retained, equity increases and 
the leverage is expected to decrease.   
 
According to Frank and Goyal (2007), Brennan and Schwartz (1984) and Kane, 
Marcus and McDonald (1984) created the first dynamic models discussing tax-
savings versus bankruptcy cost trade-off.  These models, containing uncertainty, taxes 
and bankruptcy cost, supported findings made by Miller (1977).  He found that trade-
off theory predicts higher debt levels than observed in many firms.  Fischer, Heinkel 
and Zechner (1989) solve this problem by adding transaction costs to their model.  
Without transaction costs, “firms could carry large amounts of debt and, by the 
appropriate repurchase strategy, capture large tax shields while keeping the debt 
essentially riskless” (Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner, 1989, pp. 19).  Costs related to 
recapitalisation make financial structures change over time, but prevent continuous 
changes.  The optimal ratio is to be found in an interval and give quite similar firms 
the option to customize their debt level.  There are two reasons for recapitalisation if 
the leverage ratio increases, avoiding bankruptcy costs and compensate for 
equityholders’ limited liability (Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner, 1989).  Equityholders 
cannot sell assets to make coupon payments, as investment decisions are fixed.  The 
coupon payments therefore reduce the dividend paid to the equityholders (Fischer, 
Heinkel and Zechner, 1989).   
 
Dynamic trade-off articles can be distinguished depending on the assumptions they 
use.  The classic view assumes a firm’s cash flow as exogenous and includes among 
others Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989), while 
others assume a relation between financing and cash flow.  Taxation is handled 
differently across articles; some exclude it while others assume taxation on corporate 
payouts.   
 
When leverage ratio is optional to increase in the next period, dynamic trade-off 
theory suggests a reduction in today’s optimal level of debt (Goldstein et al, 2001).  
However, a firm will in most situations not be able to reach an optimal debt ratio 
when transaction costs exists and financing is done periodically (Frank and Goyal, 
2007).   
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Dynamic trade-off theory has some general views.  The most important is probably 
the fact that today’s optimal financial structure depends on expected optimal structure 
in the future (Frank and Goyal, 2007).    
 
 
3.3. Pecking Order Theory 
 
The pecking order theory was developed by Myers (1984) and defines a ranking of 
preferred capital.  Myers define the theory as “A firm is said to follow a pecking order 
if it prefers internal to external financing and debt to equity if it issues securities” 
(Myers, 1984, pp. 576).  Contrary to the trade-off theory, pecking order does not have 
a given debt-to-value ratio.  When external financing is needed, the safest security is 
issued first.  Straight debt is issued first, before securities as convertible bonds and in 
the end equity.  Therefore, equity is to be found at the top of the list as retained 
earnings and as external equity at the bottom.  
 
A survey (Myers, 1984) examining companies from 1973-1982 revealed that 
approximately 60% of capital expenditures were covered by internal capital.  This 
includes cash needed for new investments.   The remaining 40% were covered by 
external capital, primarily debt.  Issuing equity did only count for a small part of 
external capital.  The survey illustrates a combined use of both external and internal 
capital.  Most firms have some internal funds, kept as cash and short-term 
investments.  This form of internal capital is so common that, according to Frank and 
Goyal (2007), it is often excluded when the pecking order theory is tested.    
 
3.3.1. Asymmetric information 
Pecking order behaviour follows from simple asymmetric information models (Myers 
and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984)).  True value of a firm and growth opportunities 
are best known by the managers.  External investors can only estimate the values.  
Therefore, asymmetric information reduces the market value of shares when issued, 
as the fear of buying a lemon exists (Akerlof, 1970).  Akerlof (1970) uses the 
automobile market to illustrate how “bad” cars, called lemons, reduce the prices of all 
used cars and drive out the good ones.  The value will increase as investors learn what 
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managers already know.  In other words, managers will use equation 8 to decide 
whether or not to issue and invest.  Companies with strong investment opportunities, 
but with high cost of financial distress tend to issue convertible bonds instead of 
equity.  This give access to external finance without the lemon problem related to 
equity issuance (Rauh and Sufi, 2010).   
 Δ! = !! − ! 
Equation 8: The amount by which shares are over- or undervalued (Myers, 1984). 
 
N and N1 represent true value and investor’s expected value.  ΔN tells whether a firm 
is over- or undervalued.  It will always have a lower value for debt than equity when 
new shares or debt is underpriced (Myers, 1984).  The benefits of an issue can be 
symbolized with y.  Managers issue shares if ! ≥ ∆!.  From this, it is important to be 
aware that negative inside information always lead to issuing.  When inside 
information is positive, managers might choose not to issue undervalued shares and 
miss out on investments with positive net present value (NPV).  Still, Myers and 
Majluf (1984) think a firm is better off issuing equity when the alternative is to lose 
profitable projects.  Undervalued shares would transfer value from existing 
shareholders to new investors.  However, equity is never issued when the option to 
issue debt exists.  An investment with positive NPV is always exploited if default-risk 
free debt can be issued and sometimes passed if only risky debt exists.  From this, 
Myers and Majluf (1984, pp. 207) summarise with the rule “better to issue safe 
securities than risky ones” and the conclusion that a firm will always issue debt and 
never equity.  The general rule is also to be found in Myers (1984).   
 
Asymmetric information can be two-sided, and not only one-sided as assumed by 
Myers and Majluf (1984).   Two-sided asymmetric information means both bidder 
and seller have private information about the value.  This gives multiple equilibriums 
and the preference of shares or combining shares with cash, rather than just choosing 
cash (Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel, 1990).   
 
One way to decrease asymmetry is to involve existing shareholders when issuing new 
equity, which sends a strong optimistic signal to new investors.  ∆! is then reduced as 
the expected value increases towards the true value.   
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As a result, a firm only issues equity when overpriced and debt when underpriced.  
Knowing this, an investor will not buy shares before the optimal debt level is reached.  
This somehow extreme conclusion, put forward by Myers (1984), forces a firm to 
adapt to the pecking order theory.   
  
3.3.2. Agency theory 
Managers (agents) will not always do what is best for shareholders (principals) as 
assumed so far.  An agency problem arises when agents start to act in their own 
interest and seek private benefits (Myers, 2002).  Owners can reduce this incentive by 
monitoring and compensating managers.  Perfect monitoring and compensation are 
costly and difficult to achieve.  This is included in the definition made by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976).  Here, agency cost is the sum of monitoring expenditures by the 
principal, bond expenditures by the agent and the residual loss.   
 
Agency costs are created when external owners have to bear parts of the private 
benefits going to internal owners.  Internal financing is therefore preferred to external 
financing and a pecking order is created.  Issuing debt does not affect the distribution 
of these costs.  If the debt ratio gets too high, managers can be forced by creditors to 
increase equity by an external issue.  Debt is in other words preferred before outside 
equity, which strengthens the pecking order theory.  When external equity is issued, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) prefer private equity to equity from the stock markets, 
since they face lower cost of monitoring.  Nevertheless, equity investors should not be 
allowed too much power.  Many firms, especially growth firms, choose to go public 
in order to reduce this influence.   
 
The pecking order, described by Jensen and Meckling (1976), is most suitable for 
small firms where control and ownership is highly related.  Control of managers in 
large firms must therefore be substituted by compensation and incentives like options 
and ownership.  Compensation with shares is not only affected by the value of assets 
in place, but also by growth opportunities (Myers, 2002).  
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3.3.3. Discussion 
Pecking order contains some problems.  According to the theory, managers work to 
maximize the value of existing shares (Myers, 2002).  However, why they should care 
about the valuation when equity is issued and not just maximize the firm’s value 
ignoring both new and old shareholders, are not discussed.  Pecking order does not 
contain theory explaining why the consequences of managers’ superior information 
do affect financial tactics.   
 
How does the theory hold with more complex capital structures, e.g. when choosing 
between straight and convertible debt?  This question is not answered in Myers and 
Majluf (1984) and the weakness is criticised by Myers (2002).   
 
Choosing to follow the pecking order theory means reducing the debt ratio in years 
with surplus and increase it in years with deficit, making the debt ratio appear to be 
mean-reverting (Myers, 2002).   
 
 
3.4. Empirical evidence of the trade-off and pecking order theory 
 
Examples of the theories can be found when capital structure is studied.  
Nevertheless, they have proven difficult to distinguish when empirical analyses are 
performed (Myers, 2002).  Firms with a majority of tangible assets, which are large 
and safe, tend to borrow more than those having high profitability and valuable 
growth opportunities (Myers, 2002).  This statement is supported by both theories.   
 
In 1984, Myers (1984) concluded it did not exist any empirical studies indicating that 
taxation had a clear effect on a firm’s debt policy.  MacKie-Mason (1990, referred to 
by Myers, 2002) proved later that firms with low marginal tax rates had a greater 
probability of issuing equity than those having a higher tax rate.  Demonstrating the 
positive correlation between tax and debt makes the result consistent with the trade-off 
theory.  However, the result does not prove that the interest tax shields have a major 
influence on a firm’s market value or that the trade-off theory determines debt ratios 
(Myers, 2002).   
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The empirical evidences of the trade-off theory are, according to Myers (2002), not as 
strong as they might look.  This is a result of the fact that statistical results supporting 
the trade-off theory also support other theories.  In addition, many companies 
operating with low debt ratios have proven to be successful and profitable.  The trade-
off theory would predict such firms to have a high debt ratio, as success means 
increased taxable revenues.   
 
While the trade-off theory implies a target-adjusted model, the pecking order assumes 
the debt ratio to depend on a firm’s cumulative financial deficit.  A test of time-series 
performed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999, referred to by Myers, 2002), found 
evidence supporting both theories.  They calculated the exact annual debt ratios assuming 
firms to follow the pecking order exactly.  Comparing these ratios with the target-adjusted 
model proved that the trade-off theory was constant with financial decisions based on the 
pecking order.   Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999, referred to by Myers, 2002) also ran a 
reversed test, assuming debt ratios are gradually adjusted toward the fixed ratios.  This 
gave pecking order statistical power compared to the trade-off theory, i.e. pecking order 
theory had the best explanation of the financial behavior in the test.  Frank and Goyal 
(2001, referred to by Myers, 2002) used the same time-series specification on a larger 
sample, and proved that financial behavior is more complicated than predicted by the 
pecking order.  The theory does best explain large companies with moderate leverage 
(Frank and Goyal, 2001, referred to by Myers, 2002).  Barclay and Smith (2005) support 
these findings and state that the pecking order cannot fully explain the financial policy 
choices.    
 
Fama and French (2002) tested the dividend and leverage predictions in both theories.  
The predictions shared by the theories, are tested and mostly confirmed.  They located 
disagreements between the trade-off theory and pecking order on two important 
issues.  In addition, there is a third issue creating difficulties for the pecking order.   
The first issue is the relation between profitability and leverage.  Fama and French 
(2002) support the pecking order theory, which predicts a negative relation between 
profitability and leverage.  The trade-off theory assumes a positive correlation 
between the two variables, making this an “important failure of the trade-off model” 
(Fama and French, 2002, pp. 29).  Leverage targets are used by the trade-off theory 
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and the leverage moves towards it.  The pecking order does not use target ratios and 
the leverage in the model is therefore not mean-reverting.  Fama and French (2002) 
find empirical evidence that the leverage is mean-reverting in their regressions, but 
the rates are weak.  This made it impossible to draw a conclusion on the second issue.  
The third issue, which creates huge problems for the pecking order, is the large equity 
issues done by small-leveraged growth firms (Fama and French, 2002).  They 
conclude that their article “cannot tell whether the results are due to trade-off forces 
or pecking order forces or indeed other factors overlooked by both” (Fama and 
French, 2002, pp. 30).   
 
The key to reconcile the different theories is an increase in the understanding of 
“stocks and flows” (Barclay and Smith, 2005, pp. 16).  Stocks are used to describe the 
level of debt and equity related to the target, while flows are used to define the 
decisions related to the issuing of different securities (Barclay and Smith, 2005).  
Further, they argue that the pecking order model is an information-based theory with 
focus on the flows, i.e. the cost of using debt or equity.  The pecking order alone 
cannot offer a reliable guidance to the optimal capital structure, as both stocks and 
flows influence the choice between debt and equity (Barclay and Smith, 2005). 
 
In order to create a sensible capital structure, costs related to deviating from the target 
capital structure and adjusting towards it must be understood (Barclay and Smith, 
2005).   
 
 
3.5. Taxation 
 
When performing studies of capital structure, tax is often ignored in order to simplify 
the research.  However, taxation does affect a firm and shareholders.  Throughout the 
years, different hypotheses about tax effects have existed.  Fama and French (1998) 
present some theories.  These hypotheses have been rewritten as new research has 
proven the previous wrong or imperfect.  Higher dividend payouts where assumed to 
give lower stock prices since dividends had a higher tax rate than capital gains 
(Brennan, 1970).  Miller and Scholes (1978) found that tax on dividend could be 
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avoided if retirement plans or offsetting deduction of personal interest payments were 
used to invest in stocks.  They later came with a new model (Miller and Scholes, 
1982) saying “firm value is unaffected by dividend policy because pricing is 
dominated by investors subject to symmetric taxation of dividends and capital gains” 
(Fama and French, 1998, pp. 828).     
 
According to (Fama and French, 1998), there is little convincing evidence on how the 
pricing of dividends and debt are affected by taxes.  Pricing of dividend can give a 
negative tax effect.  This predicts a positive relation between expected stock return 
and the percentage of expected stock return received as dividend (Fama and French, 
1998).  It is common to use a dividend-price ratio as proxy for the effect.  However, 
the result from this test depends on how the dividend-price ratio is measured.   
 
Fama and French (1998) use a cross-sectional regression model of firm value on 
earnings, investment and financing variables to measure how taxation of dividend and 
debt affects the firm value.  Should the regression be able to capture and isolate the 
tax effect of debt, all information related to profitability has to be captured by the 
earnings, dividend and investment variables.  If not, the debt slopes from the model 
would be a mix of agency, asymmetric-information, bankruptcy, proxy and tax 
effects.  The debt slope measures the sensitivity of firm value to the level of debt.   
 
 
3.6. Debt 
 
A multi-tiered capital structure consists of both secured debt and subordinated debt.  
The secured debt is often bank debt with tighter covenants than the subordinated debt.  
Rauh and Sufi (2010) classify debt into categories, described in table 6.   
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Table 6: Classification of debt5 (Rauh and Sufi, 2010).  The table divides debt into different 
categories.  
 
Debt can be secured, unsecured or subordinated.  This describes the priority of the 
different tiers.  Debt is secured if it has collateral in any of the firm’s assets, is a 
mortgage bond or an equipment loan.   
 
Low credit rated companies spread the priority of their capital structure, which means 
using multiple tiers of debt divided into secured, unsecured and subordinated issues.  
Higher rating reduces the number of tiers to unsecured debt and equity.  The credit 
rating influences the use of tiers, as the rating level determines the access to liquidity.  
A speculative credit rating will limit the access to different types of credit.  Firms in 
this category must rely on debt issued by banks.   
 
This illustrates the fact that firms simultaneously use different types of debt.  They 
often change the composition of their capital structure, even though total debt is 
constant.  The level of debt used depends on whether the firm has a high market-to-
book value or high asset tangibility.  E.g. a regression analysis performed by Rauh 
and Sufi (2010) shows that firms with high market-to-book value tend to use less debt 
than those with high asset tangibility.  This result has a high level of heterogeneity, 
which is an important factor of the pecking order theory.  It can be found when debt is 
categorized and individual correlations are calculated.  While convertible bonds and 
non-rule 144A private placements contribute to a negative correlation, bank debt 
gives a weak positive correlation between profitability and leverage (Rauh and Sufi, 
2010).   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Rule	  144	  regulates	  public	  resale	  of	  restricted	  and	  control	  securities	  (SEC).	  	  Rule	  144A	  regulates	  private	  resale	  of	  securities	  to	  institutions	  (University	  of	  Cincinnati).	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3.7. Leasing  
 
Leasing can be defined as selling the rights to use an asset for a given period of time, 
without the transfer of ownership (Grenadier, 1996).  It can be looked upon as a 
substitute to debt.  This is suggested by prevailing theories within finance and 
economics (Ang and Peterson, 1984).  Ang and Peterson (1984) define the debt-to-
lease displacement ratio, α, as shown by equation 9.   
 !"!" = !"! + α!"! 
Equation 9: The debt-to-lease displacement ratio (Ang and Peterson, 1984).   
 
The debt ratio to a firm that does not lease is defined as DRNL, while DRL is the debt 
ratio to a firm that leases.   LRL is then the leasing ratio to the latter.  α must have a 
value which makes the aggregate debt levels of the two firms identical, as leasing and 
debt is defined as substitutes.  Different theories propose three values of α: equal to 1, 
between 0 and 1 and larger than 1 (Ang and Peterson, 1984).  These alternatives 
suggest that debt and leasing is perfect substitutes, leasing generate risk not inherent 
in debt contracts and the debt displacement by leases is greater than one to one.  Debt 
capacity is, for all alternatives, expected to decrease when leasing is used (Ang and 
Peterson, 1984).  An empirical study performed by Ang and Peterson (1984) reveals 
that firms with leasing had higher debt ratios6 than those who did not use leasing.  
Further analysis found a positive relation between debt and leases, while the relation 
between the operating leverage and leases was negative.  In other words, Ang and 
Peterson (1984) could not find a trade-off between debt and leasing.  Instead they find 
a complementary relationship, which was the opposite of prevailing theories.   
 
Smith and Wakeman (1985) prove that the coexistence of leased and purchased assets 
is uniformly neither positive nor negative.  However, this result might vary between 
industries, as the benefits from leasing fluctuate (Smith and Wakeman, 1985).  The 
majority of leasing theories keep cash flow from both leasing and owning constant 
and focus on the tax benefits.  Smith and Wakeman (1985) found eight nontax 
incentives to lease an asset, given by table 7.  These, together with other findings in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Ang	  and	  Peterson	  (1984)	  calculated	  the	  debt	  ratios	  as	  debt	  divided	  by	  book	  value	  of	  equity,	  market	  value	  of	  equity	  and	  total	  assets	  for	  both	  leasing	  firms	  and	  non-­‐leasing	  firms.	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their article, help explaining Ang and Peterson (1984).  In addition, investment 
opportunities providing high debt capacity tend to make leasing more profitable 
(Smith and Wakeman, 1985).   
 
 
Table 7: Eight nontax incentives to lease an asset (Smith and Wakeman, 1985). 
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4 "#$%#&'(&)*#&$%%#)&'%&./)&%5#2'$,'6#0&)/&)*#&('713
8 "#$%#&'(&)*#&#95#2)#0&5#7'/0&/(&-%#&'%&%*/7)&7#,$)'+#&)/&)*#&-%#(-,&,'(#&/(&)*#&$%%#)3
: "#$%#&'(&2/75/7$)#&;/.0&2/.)7$2)%&2/.)$'.&%5#2'('2&('.$.2'$,&5/,'2<&2/+#.$.)%3
= "#$%#&'(&1$.$>#1#.)&2/15#.%$)'/.&2/.)7$2)%&2/.)$'.&57/+'%'/.%&%5#2'(<'.>
5$</((%&$%&$&(-.2)'/.&/(&)*#&7#)-7.&/.&'.+#%)#0&2$5')$,3
? "#$%#&'(&)*#&('71&'%&2,/%#,<&*#,0&%/&)*$)&7'%@&7#0-2)'/.&'%&'15/7)$.)3
A "#$%#&'(&)*#&,#%%/7&*$%&1$7@#)&5/B#73
C "#$%#&'(&)*#&,#%%/7&*$%&$&2/15$7$)'+#&$0+$.)$>#&'.&$%%#)&0'%5/%$,3
!"#$%&'('%)*&"'+,'%"-,.&%(&/,).,&)'&)..,%&
D1')*&$.0&E$@#1$.&F!GC=H
	   31	  
4. Relating capital structure theory to shipping 
 
Financing has changed during the last centuries and decades.  Earlier, trading 
companies owned vessels to carry their cargo.  This is a contrast to today’s market, 
where most ships are owned and traded in the spot and time charter market.   
 
In general, shipping companies can find financing from four sources, the shipbuilder, 
financial institutions, commercial banks and the security market (James, 1929).  It is 
most common to use one of the three last alternatives or a combination of two or more 
of them.   
 
Managing capital structure is a trade-off between financial flexibility and fiscal 
discipline, i.e. a balancing act (Goedhart, Koller and Rehm, 2006).  From this point of 
view, assuming a normal debt level, the trade-off is more important than tax benefits.  
The capital structures used by shipping companies vary.  Some, like Nordic American 
Tanker Shipping7, prefer to rely on internal funds and the issue of equity.  Others use 
the wide range of different funding alternatives.  The choice of using internal capital 
is probably related to the high volatility in the freight rates and thereby the revenues.  
At the same time as internal capital is preferred, keeping up with the competitors and 
finance investments requires a substantial level of capital.  In addition, investments 
are often done long before the vessels starts to generate revenues and the use of debt 
might be the only way to acquire the capital required.  This might be one of the 
reasons why shipping companies traditionally have been looked upon as high 
leveraged companies.   
 
A volatile and capital-intensive industry depends not only on internal but also external 
capital.  Investors often have difficulties getting the same information as the 
management about a company before they invest.  The use of debt, combined with 
uncertainty, increases the probability of financial distress and thereby the investors 
fear of investing in a lemon (Akerlof, 1970).  I.e. the pecking order can be found 
among shipping companies.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  They	  do	  however	  have	  a	  USD	  500	  million	  Credit	  Facility	  (http://www.nat.bm/).	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Shipping companies’ tend to pay little tax, since they are either registered in tax 
havens or got adjusted tax regulation like the Norwegian tax regulation of shipping 
companies, which was a part of the national budget in 2008 (Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance).  Taxation in shipping can be divided into three categories (PWC, 2009): 
 -­‐ Tonnage tax regimes -­‐ Shipping incentives regimes -­‐ Tax efficient regimes 
 
Tonnage tax regimes base their taxation of ship-owners on the tonnage of vessel 
registered, and not the income they generate.  Examples of countries using this type of 
taxation are Cyprus, Malta, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States.  
Norway started offering this in 2008, as it reregulated the taxation for the Norwegian 
International Ship Register (NIS).   
 
Shipping incentives regimes are countries offering tax provisions aimed at shipping 
companies.  Examples are Hong Kong, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Panama and 
Singapore.  These countries decrease the tax burden by reducing the tax base or the 
tax rate. 
 
Tax efficient regimes are countries with no special treatment of shipping companies.  
However, they attract vessels by offering a low efficient tax rate.  Many of the islands 
located in the Caribbean have this type of taxation.    
 
The many different registry flags, combined with complex corporate structures, gives 
the opportunity to switch towards more favourable taxation policies.  With low or no 
taxation, one of the debt arguments presented in the trade-off theory disappears since 
tax shields no longer can be used.  Without the tax shield, debt only creates costs 
related to financial distress.    
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5. The different types of funding in shipping 
 
Finance in shipping plays a major role in the maritime economics.  According to 
Cullinane (2005) the role is higher than what is found in other transportation sectors.   
 
 
5.1. Equity 
 
Equity has always been the most important way of financing new investments.  
During the twentieth century, the level of equity needed decreased as new types of 
freight contracts were created and ownership changed from private family owned to 
public companies registered on stock exchanges.  However, family ownership is still 
an important way of financing in traditional shipping locations like Greece, Norway 
and Hong Kong (Stopford, 2009) 
 
Nevertheless, equity is still essential, as the level of equity decide the level of leverage 
a company can get.  It is also the capital representing the owners.  Today, with many 
publicly owned shipping companies, owners can be banks, funds or private investors.   
 
Equity is, as written earlier, located in both ends of the capital structure.  In the case 
of bankruptcy, equity investors are the last to get their money back as equity has very 
low priority.   
 
 
5.2. Debt 
 
There are many types of debt, but the most commonly used is bank debt.  It can be 
divided into long and short term, depending on the maturity.  This is probably the 
most secure debt among a company’s liabilities as banks demand access to financial 
information before and after lending money, in addition to collateral.  The level of 
debt in shipping companies varies, depending on the investment strategies and market 
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situation.  However, these companies are ideal for the use of debt, with vessels 
qualifying as long-term assets and thereby collateral.  Nordic American Tanker 
Shipping is an example of a company relying on equity and use only small fractions 
of debt.   
 
Shipping often requires significant investments.  When lending to shipping 
companies, banks often form loan syndicates to diversify risk and reduce exposure to 
one borrower.  A loan syndicate consists of several banks.  Besides diversifying risk, 
syndicates give less experienced banks an opportunity to get involved without having 
detailed knowledge since one bank is responsible and leads the syndicate.  The 
leading bank is responsible for the relationship with the borrower and gathering the 
required amount of capital, in other word acting as an agent.  It normally charges a fee 
for this work.  If the syndicate is large, a management group might be established to 
handle issues without having to contact all participants every time a problem arises 
(Stopford, 2009).   
 
Syndicates do often get problems when the borrower gets financial difficulties and the 
participants have different experience with shipping.  A bank without the 
understanding might not handle the cycles the same way as those with knowledge.  
Therefore, banks offering joint financing are preferred to a diversified syndicate.   
 
 
5.3. Bonds 
 
Capital can also be raised in the bond market.  Bonds are interest-bearing securities 
with more than one-year maturity.  In the shipping industry, most bonds are issued 
with a five-year maturity (Liang, Liu, Lin and Yeh, 2006).  
 
The companies are responsible for issuing bonds and the level of security is decided 
by the bond ratings.   Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s (S&P) are two of the world’s 
larges rating agencies.  Interest rate paid on a bond depend on the rating, e.g. a bond 
rated AAA by S&P is more secure and pay less interest than a bond rated BB.   
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When issuing bonds, an indenture is made between issuer and the buyer.  The purpose 
is to protect the bondholder and it contains property pledges, protective covenants and 
working capital requirements.   
 
Evaluation of the risk related to bonds is important for both investors and managers, 
as shipping is capital intensive with high debt ratios.  Bond ratings are also affected 
by revenues and thereby the significant volatility in freight rates.  Oil prices and 
exchange rates are other variables influencing the financial stability.   
 
 
Figure 2: Basic structure of shipping bond issue (Stopford, 2009). 
 
5.3.1.Convertible bonds 
A convertible bond is a bond issued as debt with the right to convert to shares before 
or at a certain date.  The owner of a bond decides whether or not to take advantage of 
the conversion right.  This makes, in many situations, convertible bonds more 
attractive to investors than straight bonds.   
 
Convertible debt is often subordinated to other debt, and carries a lower coupon rate 
(Brennan and Schwartz, 1980).  The lower rate can be explained by the conversion 
opportunity, which often is a significant part of the bond value.    
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Shipping companies frequently uses this type of bond.  Table 8 illustrates the 
convertible bonds currently held by Euronav and Frontline.   
 
 
Table 8: Convertible bonds (http://www.frontline.bm and http://www.euronav.com). 
  
Graph 6 shows the development in the value of these convertible bonds from the date 
of issue until beginning of May 2011.   
 
 
Graph 6: Development in value of convertible bonds in per cent of value at issuing date 
(Datastream). 
 
5.3.2. Junk bonds 
Junk bonds are also called high yield and speculative bonds, and are bonds with credit 
rating BB (S&P) or lower.  The low rating is a result of a high risk of default and 
gives the bond an interest rate above those with better rating.  High yield bonds 
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experienced a boom in the 1980s, even though they have been around for a long time 
(Gilson and Warner, 1997).  The issuers of such bonds tend to have high debt ratios, 
often as high as 90% or 95%, which gives a high rate of defaults (Brealey, Myers and 
Allen, 2008).   
 
Firms with high growth can use junk bonds together with, or as an alternative to bank 
debt (Gilson and Warner, 1997).  Historically, high yield bonds are issued in order to 
pay back bank debt.  Gilson and Warner (1997) found that most bank debt is not 
straight debt, but revolving credit agreements8.  Compared to bank debt, junk bonds 
have fewer covenants attached and are less secure.  In addition, maturity on high yield 
bonds is often longer than on bank debt.  Both revolving debt and junk bonds give 
flexibility, but in different ways (Gilson and Warner, 1997).  Therefore, the optimal 
mix of debt will follow a company’s financial needs.  Junk bonds are often issued 
when revenues decline and bank debt must be repaid, as mentioned above.   
 
The owners of bonds have a huge influence on the company.  In fact, they have the 
power to take over the control.  Michael Milken, one of the most important and 
dominant bond traders in the 1980s pointed this out by declaring: “if you miss one 
payment, we’ll take the company away”(Lewis, 2006, pp. 256).   
 
Most of the shipping companies get the junk bond grade on their bonds due to the 
high volatility in the freight market (Stopford 2009).   
 
After the financial crisis in 2008, the central banks have pushed down the LIBOR 
interest rate.  However, this reduction in cost has not been passed on from banks to 
their costumers (Kaminska, 2009).  This is especially the case in the shipping industry 
and it had in late 2009 to pay a premium above LIBOR, which was higher than during 
the peak of the financial crisis (Kaminska, 2009).  This creates difficulties for an 
industry already struggling to get credit.  Covenants like loan-to-value tests reinforce 
the problem, as the entire business battle with reduced revenues and depreciating 
assets.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The	  borrower	  has	  the	  option	  to	  obtain	  additional	  funds	  as	  long	  as	  predetermined	  financial	  benchmarks	  are	  met	  (Gilson	  and	  Warner,	  1997).	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Issuing equity as an initial public offering (IPO) or secondary public offering (SPO) 
will dilute existing owners and is not a preferred option to access new capital in an 
industry with a high level of family owned companies.  Instead Kaminska (2009) 
refers to ICAP9, which predict an increase in shipping companies using non-bank 
finance to refinance and repay debt.   
 
 
5.4. Mezzanine financing 
 
Mezzanine financing is high yield debt often attached with an equity kicker like 
equity warrants (Stopford, 2009).  The equity warrant gives the opportunity to convert 
from debt to preference shares or common shares at a certain time and is therefore an 
equity-based European option.  As high yield debt, the interest rate following 
mezzanine financing is normally considerably higher than LIBOR.  The preferred 
shares include payments as a fixed annual dividend, a percentage of the cash flow 
after interest and the repayment of the principal.   
 
The difficulties related to defining mezzanine financing and its complexity makes it a 
financial instrument not often used in the shipping industry.   
 
 
5.5. Leasing 
 
Many shipping companies use leasing to finance their assets.  Leasing can either be 
financial (capital) or operating.  Financial leases are shown on the balance sheet, 
while operating leases generally do not appear.  One reason is the length of the lease.  
Assets are leased for a longer time period when classified as financial lease compared 
to operating lease, and is therefore more suitable for defining the lease of vessels.  
However, the use of operational lease does occur.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  ICAP	  is	  a	  large	  voice	  and	  electronic	  interdealer	  broker	  and	  provider	  of	  post	  trade	  risk	  and	  information	  services.	  	  It	  is	  active	  in	  the	  wholesale	  markets	  in	  interest	  rates,	  credit,	  commodities,	  foreign	  exchange,	  emerging	  markets,	  equities	  and	  equity	  derivatives	  (ICAP).	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Leasing includes risk related to revenues, operations and the residual value.  The legal 
owner, named lessor, is left with most of the risk in an operating lease.  With the use 
of financial lease, which is common in shipping, the company leasing an asset (lessee) 
is responsible for the operation.  The leasing alternative gives, in many countries, tax 
benefits to the lessor.  Companies with high profit, but without suitable investment 
opportunities within their own industry, can invest in a vessel.  They will then receive 
both the tax relief from purchasing a vessel and income from leasing it to a ship-
owner.   
 
 
Figure 3: Typical lease finance model (Stopford, 2009).  The figure illustrates the relations between 
the lessee, lessor, shipyard and the bank in a leasing process.   
 
There are several advantages with leasing.  Ship-owners are provided with longer 
maturity (15-25 years) than received from commercial banks (Stopford, 2009) and the 
cost of capital is reduced to tax benefits.  The extent of the tax benefits is included in 
the charter back agreement.  Leasing also includes some drawbacks.  Often, the lessor 
has little or no interest in the vessel except as an investment and has to rely on the 
lessee fulfilling the leasing agreement.  In addition, the leasing contract is often a 
long-term transaction, making it sometimes more complicated to lease rather than 
own the vessel.   
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6. What affects the choice of funding? 
 
The most efficient way of funding a company or an investment depends on multiple 
factors.  I.e. funding is about raising and manage disposable capital, based on a 
business strategy and the financial situation.  Actions like expansion, reinvestment, 
speculation and defending a market position might require different types of capital.  
In general, funding is divided into two main categories, debt and equity.  Both include 
sub categories, and it exist many different hybrids.  The many alternatives make it 
interesting to look at some factors affecting the choice.   
 
 
6.1. Asset play 
 
The shipping industry moves, as written earlier, in cycles.  The high level of 
homogeneity and competition in the industry influence the value and thereby the price 
of the vessels.  E.g. the value of a vessel can be reduced due to a downturn in the 
market, keeping the quality constant.  Many owners attempt to take advantage of this 
when it comes to buying and selling.  Investments in new vessels, either in the new-
building- or second-hand market, are done when the price and value of vessels are 
looked upon as low.  When the market recovers, these investments are sold.  This 
speculation in the buying and selling of assets is called asset play and is an opposite to 
the long term industrial investor (Birkeland d.y. and Eide, 2000).  Asset play focuses 
on timing the business transactions, and has less focus on the profit from operations 
compared to a long-term investment.   
 
To be able to buy and sell when the market is at the bottom and at top, some 
expectations about capital structure exists.  With a too high level of debt, a market 
decline creates difficulties to access new capital and invest right before a recovery is 
expected to take place.  In addition, conventional sources of capital often have no or 
little interest of being exposed to shipping during these cyclic downturns.  In the 
middle of the 1980s, the shipping market was at the bottom of a cycle.  To get access 
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to capital, new and untraditional methods were used, like constructing self-liquidating 
ship funds (Stopford, 2009).  The first was established in 1984 and gave a return equal 
to four times the investment.  Similar funds were created and as the market recovered 
more capital was invested.  Increased activity gave higher prices and lower profits as 
the cycle moved towards a peak.   
 
Asset playing is, according to Goulielmos (2009), safer than operating in the freight 
market.  Goulielmos (2009) estimates the ratio to be three to one, as the profit from 
one good sale is equal to the profit from three years of operating a vessel.    
 
 
6.2. Owning or leasing 
 
Whether to own or lease is often a case when it comes to investments in shipping.  
Owning means the company must have large amount of capital available to buy, in 
addition to be responsible for the cost of maintenance and operation.  Leasing, either 
as bareboat or time charter gives the opportunity to dispose a vessel without 
purchasing it.  A lessee also avoids tying up capital in assets.  The eight nontax 
incentives to lease an asset found by Smith and Wakeman (1985) can be used in the 
shipping market.  Vessels, i.e. the assets, are for example not specialized to individual 
firms and the expected period of use might be less than the assets lifetime.  The ideal 
period to use a vessel is relative short when market cycles last approximately eight 
years (Stopford, 2009) and the lifetime of vessels can be somewhere between 25 and 
30 years.   
 
Choosing between the two alternatives might also be affected by the company’s 
market view and strategy.  An example is Frontline, which leases a vast majority of its 
vessels from Shipfinance on time charter basis.  This gives Frontline fixed operational 
costs.  In return, Shipfinance receives a fixed return and tax benefits from the leasing.  
Knightsbridge Tankers is another example of a company choosing to lease.  They did 
not own any vessels between 2000 and 2004.  Others, like Nordic American Tanker 
Shipping and Euroseas, own all their vessels.  Owning vessels, often with a long 
expected lifetime, makes it possible to increase the level of debt.  Companies can 
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therefore be tempted to increase the level by using existing and acquired vessels as 
collateral.  Ship-owners who operate their assets in the time charter- or bare boat 
market secure their income, and thereby reduce some of the uncertainty and volatility 
well known in the industry.   
 
 
6.3. Market conditions 
 
The market cycles affects the choice of funding.  Capital theory suggests the use of 
equity in good times when companies are overvalued and debt in depressions when 
values are underestimated.  Difficult times have historically also been the source of 
new financial alternatives, like self-liquidating ship funds.   
 
Market conditions are influenced by variables like the oil prices, interest rates and the 
supply and demand in the world economy.  High activity in the world economy 
increases the demand for transportation of goods, and freight rates raise.  The 
revenues raise as the activity and thereby the freight rates pick up, which makes it 
easier to access new capital.  In the end, the situation overheats as high activity results 
in the construction and entering of too many new vessels.  The participants, in their 
eager to increase profits, create this downturn.  This illustrates how the market cycles, 
described by Stopford (2009) can be formed.   
 
 
6.4. Newbuilding market and second-hand market  
 
It has historically been a close correlation between the peaks in the freight rates and 
the peaks in the ordering of new vessels (Stopford, 2009).  As market conditions 
improve, the demand for vessels increases. This raise the question whether to build a 
new vessel or buy one that already exists.  Both prices raise and fall depending on the 
demand.  E.g. in difficult times, the price of a second-hand vessel can be close to the 
scrapping price.  It will increase as the market recovers.  This also affects the price on 
newbuilding, as the growth makes the two alternatives more comparable.  However, it 
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is important to notice that a newbuilding will not arrive in the market immediately as 
there is a time lag between ordering and delivery.  A lag means that today’s freight 
rates only partial influence the price of a new vessel.  The other important factor is the 
prices in the second-hand market.  These prices are not based on the historical costs of 
building vessels, but on the opportunity to earn a profit today (Goulielmos, 1974, PhD 
thesis, referred to by Goulielmos, 2009).  The lag creates a risk of investing in an 
upturn with delivery after the market has started to go down.  A five-year old vessel 
is, according to Stopford (2009), valuated by the Sales and Purchase market10 four to 
six times its annual income when the freight rate for a one-year time charter is high.   
 
Goulielmos (2009), states that Greek ship-owners historically have preferred to 
purchase second-hand vessels.  Buying a vessel in one or the other market indicate a 
certain market view.  I.e. a company will not order a vessel if it believes delivery will 
be in a market downturn.  On the other side, investing in a new vessel is most likely 
an investment in an asset with longer maturity.  
 
A newbuilding does not normally require the entire investment paid up front, as often 
required in the second-hand market.  The settlement of a newbuilding is normally 
divided into five equal payments; the first paid when the contract is signed and the 
last when the vessel is delivered.  A vessel bought in the second hand market is often 
financed by two payments.  10% of the value is paid when the contract is signed and 
the remaining 90% when it is delivered (Fearnleys). 
 
 
6.5. Risk 
 
Operating in the shipping industry involves a certain level of risk, as the industry is 
known for its volatility.  This affects the funding, as participants seldom get a high 
credit rating from the credit agencies.  It would be expected that, given the level of 
uncertainty, shipping companies had chosen ways of funding with the purpose of 
reducing the risk.  Instead, the industry is known for the willingness to take risk and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The	  Sale	  and	  Purchase	  market	  is	  the	  name	  of	  the	  market	  in	  which	  the	  second-­‐hand	  vessels	  are	  bought	  and	  sold.	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thinking “this time it is different”.  The result is the well-known market cycles, 
repeating again and again, often triggered by the same problems.  However, 
developing a countercyclical capital structure gives the ability to invest in downturns 
and thereby increase earnings compared to competitors (Goedhart, Koller and Rehm, 
2006).   
 
Problems related to how the companies are financed can be defined as internal factors, 
since the management can affect the structure and thereby the risk.  External factors 
like economical and political stability creates risk not possible to control.  Unstable 
political situations, like the conflicts in the Middle East during the 1970s, tend to 
increase the demand for tonnage.  The closing of the Suez Canal forced all vessels 
going between east and west to proceed around Africa, a voyage taking significantly 
more time.  This created the large increase in the world seaborne trade measured in 
tonne miles, shown above in graph 1.  Financial downturns make it difficult to finance 
companies, as it gets more severe to borrow and raise capital.   
   
The fluctuations create a low average return gained at a high level of risk.  Many have 
tried to succeed, but not everyone has managed to make a fortune like John 
Fredriksen.  This diversified outcome is known as the shipping return paradox 
(Stopford, 2009).  Graph 7 compares the return of equity between 1992 and 1999 for 
shipping companies registered at Oslo Stock Exchange with other business segments 
(Birkeland d.y. and Eide, 2000).  The average rate of return of the eight sectors is 
8.11%, which means shipping has a return below both the average and the total 
market.  Further, the standard deviation frequency in the shipping sector is low 
compared to some of the other sectors.  This is related to the low rate of return in the 
shipping segment.   
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Graph 7: Return on equity and standard deviation between 1992 and 1999 (Birkeland d.y. and 
Eide, 2000).  The graph is a comparison of different business sectors at Oslo Stock Exchange.   
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7. Financial- and market data 
 
During the history, financing has been done differently.  New ways have been created 
as the competition and market conditions have changed.  This master thesis examines 
both dry bulk companies and tanker companies in order to find out how the financing 
has changed during the last ten years.  In addition, freight rates, interest rate for 10-
year US treasury securities and oil prices are studied.   
 
 
7.1. Time frame 
 
The thesis uses data from year 2000 until 2010.  This time frame gave the opportunity 
to observe both a raise and decline in the shipping market, as well as the world 
economy, since it includes the financial crisis.   
 
 
7.2. Company data 
 
In this thesis, I have studied 11 dry bulk companies and 13 tanker companies.  
These operate in different markets, but are at the same time quite similar.  This 
provided the opportunity to compare the two samples.  The company data is collected 
from both annual reports and Datastream.  Annual reports have, among other things, 
been used to do random checks and to control the data.  They were retrieved from 
both NYSE Euronext and the companies’ webpages.   
 
7.2.1. Beta 
Datastream was used to collect the annual historical beta for each of the 24 
companies.  Beta measures the volatility of a company compared to the market 
volatility and is a commonly used benchmark.  This makes it possible to study how 
the volatilities change as freight rates fluctuates.   
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7.3. Crude oil prices 
 
Weekly and annual spot prices for both Brent- and WTI crude oil have been studied.  
In the analysis, only one has been used, since they had a correlation coefficient equal 
to 0.9971.  This coefficient is based on the weekly spot prices.  Brent has been chosen 
as the reference, as it is used to price approximately two-thirds of the crude oil traded 
internationally (Neste Oil).  Spot prices were found at the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration webpage.  Fluctuations in the crude oil price are important, as crude 
oil is the main cargo carried by the tanker fleet and probably the most important input 
factor when operating a vessel.   
 
 
7.4. Financial market 
 
To compare the shipping industry with the financial market, a representative index 
has to be selected.  The companies studied are mainly traded on NASDAQ, NYSE 
and OSE.  Oslo Shipping Index (OSLSHX), an index consisting of 24 companies 
operating in the shipping sector, is chosen to represent the development in the market.  
The index values are retrieved from Oslo Stock Exchange.   
 
 
7.5. Freight rates 
 
The freight rate dataset contains 12 different dry bulk voyages and 16 different tanker 
voyages (Appendix D).  Dry bulk freight rates are stated as USD/day and USD/ton, 
while tank freight rates are given in WS.  The rates are based on the Fearnleys 
Weekly report.  Annual freight rates are set to be the last reported weekly rate each 
year.   
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7.6. Interest rate 
 
The weekly reported yield on 10-year US treasury securities quoted on investment 
basis, have been used as a benchmark to compare interest rates with changes in the 
freight rates and share prices.  This interest rate was retrieved from the U.S. Federal 
Reserve.   
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8. Analysing the data 
 
The collection and processing of the data, combined with the study of capital structure 
theory, formed some expectations.  Among other things, it would be natural to assume 
that the volatile shipping industry would have a risk adverse capital structure. 
 
8.1. Hypotheses 
 
The first three hypotheses are based on the capital structure theory and other theory 
presented in this master thesis, while the remaining hypotheses are based on personal 
expectations about the shipping industry.   
 
Hypothesis 1: 
Rauh and Sufi (2010) shows that firms with high market-to-book value tend to use 
less debt than those with high asset tangibility.  Can this be found in shipping? 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
Can the shipping market explain the debt-equity ratio?  This ratio is predicted to 
change as the freight rates fluctuate.  The level of equity is expected to increase when 
the market raise and revenues increase, as companies prefer to use internal capital 
(Myers, 1984).  In other words, the debt-equity ratio and the freight rates should be 
substitutes when a company follow the pecking order.  Assuming this capital 
structure, the debt-equity ratio and stock price should be substitutes.   
 
Hypothesis 3: 
The use of financial leases will decrease and owning will increase as the market 
moves towards a peak.  Leasing and debt will, as found by Ang and Peterson (1984), 
be complementary.   
 
Hypothesis 4: 
Historical beta can be explained by fluctuations in the shipping market, as a firm’s 
volatility depends on the volatility of the market it operates in.   
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Hypothesis 5: 
Freight rates influence the fluctuations in the companies’ stock prices and thereby 
affect the financial market, i.e. the OSLSHX. 
 
Hypothesis 6: 
Interest rate, given as the yield on 10 year US treasury securities, affects the freight 
rates negatively and thereby the stock prices.  This creates an expectation to find 
higher freight rates when the world economy performs well and the interest rate is 
low.   
 
Hypothesis 7: 
Return on equity and the return on invested capital are affected by beta, the debt-
equity ratio and freight rates.  The return will increase as the freight markets improve. 
 
Hypothesis 8: 
Freight rates in the tanker segment affects freight rates in the dry bulk market, and the 
other way around.  The tanker market can be divided into crude oil and refined 
products, as written in chapter 2.4.1.  As the tanker and dry bulk segments are 
expected to influence each other, the crude oil- and refined products segments will do 
the same.   
 
Hypothesis 9: 
Brent crude oil spot price is expected to affect the freight rates, the return on equity, 
the return on invested capital and the stock price.   
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8.2. Statistical methods 
 
In order to test the hypotheses stated above, two types of statistical methods were 
used.   
 
8.2.1. Correlation 
The simple regression method was first chosen to analyse the data.  Equation 10 
calculates the correlation coefficients.  They are used to describe the linear relation 
between the different types of data collected.   
 !"##$% !,! = ! − ! ! − !! − ! ! ! − ! ! 
Equation 10: The correlation formula.   
 
8.2.2. Regression 
Simple correlation is not a strong empirical analysis.  Therefore, multiple regression 
models were generated to perform more significant testing.  Equation 11 illustrates 
the general multiple regression formula, where y is the dependent variable, x is the 
independent variables11, β the coefficients, k the number of independent variables and 
ε the error variable. This thesis uses dummy variables in the multiple regressions.  A 
dummy variable makes it possible to narrow down the amount of equations needed.  
Minitab, a statistical computer software, was used to create the models.  The program 
determines which of the input variables to use and removes those with a too high 
correlation.   
 
y = !0 +!1x1 +!2x2 +...+!k xk +"  
Equation 11: The multiple regression equation (Keller, 2005). 
 
When the regression models are created, the P-values are used to determine whether 
or not to accept the equations and each variable.  A P-value less than 0.05 indicates a 
significant relationship between the independent variable and the regression model.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  An	  independent	  variable	  is	  a	  variable	  use	  to	  explain	  the	  variable	  to	  be	  forecasted.	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The coefficient of determination (R-Sq) measures the strength of the linear 
relationship in a regression model.  It indicates the percentage of variation in y 
possible to explain by the independent variables.  The F-value measures the level of 
variation in y explained by the regression model.  I.e. a large F value means most of 
the variation is described by the equation.   
 
A regression model can be valid and fit, even though none of the independent 
variables are significant.  This can be explained by performing individual t-tests of the 
coefficients of correlation between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables.  The individual variables correlate with each other and are linear related to 
y.  Collinearity in a multiple regression affects the t-test and makes none of the 
independent variables linearly related to the dependent variable (Keller, 2005).   
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9. Results 
 
Analysing financial and market related data from the past 10 years, gave some 
interesting observations.   Dividing the data into dry bulk- and tank, made it possible 
to compare both companies and segments.  The results will be presented first as a 
summary of the nine hypotheses, before they are divided into the eight variables used.   
 
 
9.1. Summary of the results 
 
The results from studying the dry bulk and tanker companies are located in table 9.  
During the analysis, it proved difficult to find the same solutions for all the companies 
in each hypothesis.    
 
 
Table 9: Summary of results.   
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9.2. Variables 
 
9.2.1. Market-to-book value, debt-total-asset ratio and the level of debt  
Rauh and Sufi (2010) proved that companies with high market-to-book value tend to 
have less debt than those with high asset tangibility.  In order to resolve if this is the 
case in shipping as well, the correlation between the market-to-book value and debt-
total asset ratio for each company were found (Appendix E, table 20).  A multiple 
regression analysis, based on the same input, was then performed.  The debt-total 
asset ratio is calculated by equation 12.  Total book values are used, as the market 
value of the assets are not easy to determine and are highly volatile.   
 !"#$ − !"!#$  !""#$  !"#$% =    !"#$%  !""#  !"#$%  !"  !"#$!"#$%  !""#  !"#$%  !"  !""#$"   
Equation 12: The debt-total asset ratio.   
 
The correlation between the market-to-book value and the debt-total asset ratio was 
then compared to the level of asset tangibility in each of the 11 dry bulk- and 13 
tanker firms (Appendix E, Table 21).  This is found by dividing the value of the 
tangible assets with the book value of the firm.  The balance sheet item called 
“property, plant and equipment” by Datastream, is chosen to measure the tangible 
assets.  From this, the hypothesis regarding the effect of market-to-book value and 
asset tangibility on the level of debt (Rauh and Sufi, 2010) can be found among the 
companies analysed.  In other words, it is possible to see some decreases in the debt-
total-asset ratio as the market-to-book value increases.   
 
A multiple regression model (Appendix F), with the market-to-book value, asset 
tangibility and the companies as variables, can solve the same hypothesis.  Each 
company is set to have a dummy variable, named by its stock ticker (Appendix C).  
Table 10 shows the coefficients, standard error and P-values from the model.   
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Table 10: Coefficient, standard error and P-value for the variables in the DebtLevel regression 
model.  The table also includes the market debt-equity ratio, market-to-book value and asset 
tangibility.   
 
Table 10 shows that the R-sq. is 85.1%, which gives a high coefficient of 
determination.  The P-value of the model is 0.000 and the F-value is 39.19.  This  
F-value is clearly above the rejection region (Appendix F).  It shows that most of the 
variation in DebtLevel, i.e. y, is explained by the regression model.  A majority of the 
dummy variables have high P-values, which indicate the insignificance of these 
coefficients.  The significant variables, with P-values below 0.0512, tend to have 
higher levels of debt than the others.  NAT is the only exception, as this firm prefer to 
use equity.  The MarketBook variable has a P-value of 0.361, leaving only 
AssetTangibility as a significant factor.  Minitab has removed TNP due too high 
correlation with other variables.  A multiple regression model with two other 
categories of dummy variables, segment and year, gives F-values, P-values and R-Sq. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  I	  have	  chosen	  to	  include	  NAT	  among	  the	  significant	  variables,	  as	  the	  company	  has	  a	  P-­‐value	  equal	  to	  0.056.	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below those found above.  This model does also give MarketBook a high P-value and 
AssetTangibility a P-value of 0.000.  Neither the segment dummies nor the annual 
dummies get significant P-values. The first multiple regression model does therefore 
give the best answer to hypothesis 1.  It suggests the tendency stated in the hypothesis 
can be found among the companies.   
 
Commodity shipping is an industry with focus on asset management (Wijnolst and 
Wergeland, 2008) and a majority of the companies studied can be put in this category.  
This means the level of tangible assets are high for all companies, making it more 
difficult to prove the difference found by Rauh and Sufi (2010).   A large spread 
found between the correlation coefficients illustrates the situation.   
 
9.2.2. Debt-equity ratio 
Debt-equity ratio can be found by dividing debt with equity, as shown by equation 13.  
The average debt-equity ratios for the selected companies, calculated separately for 
the dry bulk and tanker segments and then in total, are found in table 11.  This shows 
that the tanker companies use more debt than those operating in the dry-bulk industry, 
when book values of equity form the basis of the calculation.  Market values of 
equity, witch is used in correlations and regression models in this thesis, give the 
opposite answer.  The difference might be explained by the many variables 
influencing a shipping company’s market value of equity, e.g. the market cycles and 
the world’s economy.  Graph 8 illustrates the fluctuations from year to year in the 
market ratio.  The level of debt can probably be explained by the high level of asset 
tangibility in shipping, and thereby the possibilities to offer collateral.   
 !"#$ − !"#$%&  !"#$% = !"#$%  !""#  !"#$%  !"  !"#$!"#$%  !"#$%  !"  !"#$%&  
Equation 13: The debt-equity ratio. 
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Table 11: The average debt-equity ratios between 2000 and 2010 (Datastream).  The table indicates 
that the average dry bulk book value of debt compared to book value of equity is below the average 
tanker ratio.  However, the tanker ratio is above the dry bulk ratio if market value of equity is used. 
 
 
Graph 8: Fluctuations in the average market debt-equity ratios (Datastream).  The graph shows that 
the dry bulk companies experienced the highest ratio until 2003.  From 2003, the two ratios highly 
correlated.  The debt-equity ratio for Dampskibsselskabet NORDEN in year 2000 is removed due to a 
significant larger value than the other companies. 
 
Assuming that internal capital is preferred before external capital gives the 
expectation that market debt-equity ratio should correlate negative with the share 
price.  This cannot be confirmed by studying the correlation for each of the firms 
(Appendix E, table 22).  Both the dry bulk and tanker firms have positive and 
negative coefficients.  The positive coefficients were slightly more significant than the 
negative coefficients, indicating a marginally positive relation between the debt-
equity ratio and market-book ratio.  An increase in the amount of data should be 
considered, in order to try finding a result with less spread among the coefficients.  
 
The volatility in the freight rates might affect the debt-equity ratio as higher freight 
rates generate more equity and thereby a decrease in the ratio, assuming a constant 
level of debt.  This influence does probably have a lag, as it might take time before a 
change in the freight rates is visible in the ratio.  Calculating the correlations between 
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the ratios and freight rates (Appendix E table 23 and 24), give a large spread between 
the coefficients and approximately 60% are negative.  This might be explained by the 
different financial and operational strategies among the companies.  Some use a high 
level of leverage, while others rely solely on equity.  A company defined as a tanker 
company might correlate different with crude oil freight rates and refined products 
freight rates, as vessels rarely switch between crude- and refined cargoes.        
 
As the correlations did not give a clear answer to whether reject or accept the 
relationship between the debt-equity ratios, freight rates and stock prices, a multiple 
correlation equation was created (Appendix F).  This model uses two types of dummy 
variables, a segment dummy and a company dummy.  The stock price is measured as 
the market-to-book ratio to avoid affections from the amount of outstanding stocks.   
 
Table 12 lists the variables used in the equation.  Minitab has removed the 
independent variables and the dummy variables with high correlations. This made it 
possible to determine if the individual companies and segments can be explained.   
R-Sq. has a value of 96.5%, F is equal to 99.36 and P equal to 0.000, which makes the 
model valid.  This indicates an acceptance of hypothesis 2.  The independent 
variables, except the StockPrice and the five freight rates, have P-values below 
0.00013.  However, as only four of the dummy variables have significant P-values, 
other variables must affect the ratio.  Frank and Goyal (2001, referred to by Myers, 
2002) and Barclay and Smith (2005) might explain the spread.  They found that 
financial behaviour is more complicated than predicted by the pecking order.  E.g. the 
debt-equity ratio might be explained by variables like a company’s market view, 
which is difficult to measure.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 I have chosen to include the MarketBook variable among the significant variables, as it has a P-value 
equal to 0.055.   
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Table 12: Coefficient, standard error and P-value for the variables in the D/E regression model. 
 
9.2.3. Financial leases versus owning 
The purpose of testing for difference in the use of leasing and owning is to see if this 
is related to the market conditions or just other factors like business strategies.  
Equation 14 was used to calculate the percentage of owned vessels.  The values of 
owned vessels and capital leases are found on the consolidated balance sheet in the 
companies’ annual reports.  
 !"#$%  !"##"$#  !"  !"#$"%& = !"#$%  !"  !"#$%  !"##"$#!"#$!  !"  !"#$% + !"#$%  !"  !"#$%"&  !"#$"$ 
Equation 14: The percentage of owned vessels in a shipping company.   
 
Going through the data shows that only two dry bulk companies reported financial 
leasing of vessels on their balance sheets, while four of the tanker companies did the 
same.  The dry bulk market has experienced a decrease in the level of leasing between 
2000 and 2010, whereas the level of leasing in the tanker market has been fairly 
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stable.  Comparing an average of these results with annual freight rates (Appendix E, 
table 25) gave a very low and insignificant positive correlation for most dry bulk 
voyages.  Tanker companies had a more significant correlation with the crude oil 
rates.  However, these correlations were negative, which indicates a decrease in the 
use of leasing when crude rates increase.  Refined products freight rates had a low, 
but positive correlation with the owned vessels ratio.   
 
 
Graph 9 – The average level of owned vessels between 2000 and 2010 (Annual reports).  An increase 
in the level of owned vessels indicates a decrease in the leasing.  The average level of owned vessels 
for dry bulk and tanker companies during the period were 0.94 and 0.86.   
 
The multiple regression model DebtEquity includes Owned as an independent 
variable.  This equation shows that the variable has a P-value of 0.000 and a negative 
coefficient.  In other words, the negative coefficient indicates that the debt-equity 
ratio and leasing have a positive relationship.  This is consistent with Ang and 
Peterson (1984).  They found a positive relationship between debt and leasing, which 
was supported by Smith and Wakeman (1985).  Performing a regression with the level 
of owned vessels as the dependent variable, and freight rates and the level of debt as 
independent variables supports this result.  In fact, this model finds that the companies 
having significant P-values are the companies reporting the use of financial leasing on 
their balance sheet.  Overseas Shipholding Group is the exception, as it reports the use 
of financial leasing and has a high P-value.   
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9.2.4. Beta 
Calculating the correlation between the annual historical beta and the freight rates 
indicates, as expected, that beta for most of the companies decrease when the rates 
increase.  In other words, approximately 74% of the coefficients are negative 
(Appendix E, table 26 and 27).   
 
The average annual betas for the dry bulk and tanker companies, shown by graph 10, 
have a correlation coefficient equal to 0.77.  This is influenced by Euroseas large 
negative beta in 2007.  Excluding this beta from the dataset increases the coefficient 
to 0.91.   
 
Finding annual average betas for the dry bulk- and tanker segments give betas equal 
to 0.96 and 0.91.  The average beta representing all 24 firms is then 0.93.  These 
betas, with values less than 1, indicate that the shipping market has a lower volatility 
than the stock market.  This finding is consistent with the finding from an empirical 
study of common risk factors in the container-, dry bulk and tanker segments 
performed by Drobetz, Schilling and Tegtmeier (2010).   
 
 
Graph 10: Fluctuations in the average beta (Datastream).  The negative average beta for dry bulk in 
2007 is due to Euroseas large negative beta that year.  If this single observation were put aside, the two 
segments would have almost similar betas until 2008.     
 
A regression model was then used to control these findings (Appendix F).  Minitab 
removed, as with the previous regressions, some of the variables.  The variables 
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remaining, and their values, are found in table 13.  This regression also tests the 
relationship between beta and the market-to-book ratio.   
 
  
Table 13: Coefficient, standard error and P-value for the variables in the Beta regression model. 
 
The regression has a R-Sq. equal to 39.5%, indicating less than half of the variation in 
beta can be explained by the independent variables.  This gives a weak linear 
relationship.  The F-value is 2.99, which is not far outside the rejection region 
(Appendix F).  With a P-value of 0.000, the model might be used to describe the 
relation between beta, the debt-equity ratio, the freight rates and the market-to-book 
ratio.  Studying the individual P-values disclose that most dry bulk companies have 
significant values, while the tanker values are above 0.05.  The MarketBook and debt-
equity variables have P-values of 0.691 and 0.559.  They can therefore not be used to 
explain beta.  Four14 of the six freight rates included have significant P-value, and can 
thereby be capable of explaining the model.  In other words, beta seems to be affected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Tubarao/R.dam is included among the significant variables, as it has a P-value just above 0.05.   
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by the revenue generated from freight rates. It is interesting to observe how the 
regression can describe dry bulk betas and not tanker betas.   
 
9.2.5. Freight rates 
Comparing the freight rates to fluctuations in the companies stocks (Appendix E, 
table 28 and 29), i.e. the stock prices, indicate whether they affect each other or not.  
The majority of the tanker freight rates have a correlation between 0 and 0.5, while 
most of the dry bulk rates have correlation coefficients above 0.7.  This means the dry 
bulk market and the companies’ stock prices will follow each other more closely.  In 
other words, an increase in the stock prices follows from an increase in the freight 
rates.  Comparing the rates to OSLSHX (Appendix E, table 30), i.e. comparing the 
freight rates to a stock index, gives correlation coefficients below those fund between 
rates and the share prices.   
 
How freight rates influence the stock prices might be explained by multiple regression 
(Appendix F).  This model does also include the influence from OSLSHX and the 
Brent crude oil spot price.  Table 14 illustrates the values of the variables.  The 
remaining freight voyages, companies and segment are removed by Minitab due to 
correlation with other variables.  Creating a model gives a R-Sq. value of 75.3%, a  
F-value of 11.75 and a P-value of 0.000.  The R-Sq. value indicates that 
approximately tree quarters of the variation can be explained by the independent 
variables.  OSLSHX and Brent, with P-values of 0.05615 and 0.021 do affect the stock 
prices.  However, the OSLSHX have a negative coefficient.  To control this, the 
regression was then performed without the Brent variable and then without the 
OSLSHX variable.  This gave the same types of coefficients, but the P-values were 
reduced.  The fact that many of the companies used in this thesis are not listed on 
OSL might explain the negative coefficient.  Different types of sipping companies are 
included in this index, which can contribute to the negative correlation between the 
index and the stock prices.  E.g. companies like Aker Philadelphia Shipyard and	  	  
Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holding do not operate in the dry bulk or tanker segments, and 
might fluctuate without affecting the companies used in this thesis.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  OSLSHX	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  significant,	  as	  it	  has	  a	  P-­‐value	  just	  above	  0.05.	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The vast majority of the companies do have p-values above 0.05.  In other words, the 
model can be used to explain the variation, but factors not included explain a 
significant part of the dependent variable.  The freight rates correlates, as found in the 
other regressions used in this thesis.  This is visible trough the elimination of many 
voyages when the regression equation is generated by Minitab.  A similar result is 
found when two matrixes, calculating the correlation between dry bulk- and tanker 
rates and crude oil- and refined products rates are created (Appendix E, table 36 and 
37).   
 
  
Table 14: Coefficient, standard error and P-value for the variables in the StockPrice regression 
model. 
 
The correlations between tanker freight rates and the yield on 10-year U.S. treasury 
securities are mixed, but the majority is weakly positive.  Calculating the dry bulk 
correlations (Appendix E table 31) give mixed, but weak coefficients.  Both segments 
should go through further examination in order to determine whether to accept or 
reject the hypothesis.  The multiple regression model named FreightRate measures the 
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relationship between weekly reported spot freight rates, interest rates, and Brent spot 
prices (Appendix F).  This generated a model with R-Sq. equal to 60.1%, a F-value of 
730.72 and a P-value of 0.000, which means the model is valid.  Both the crude oil- 
and interest variable have P-values of 0.000, which illustrates the influence on the 
spot freight rates.  All variables used can be found in table 15.  The table illustrates 
the fact that the regression model explains some freight rates better than others.   
 
 
Table 15: Coefficient, standard error and P-value for the variables in the FreightRate regression 
model. 
 
9.2.6. Brent crude oil 
 
Fluctuations in the crude oil price are expected to be important, as crude oil is the 
main cargo for tanker vessels and the single most important input factor when 
operating a vessel.  The fluctuation can be illustrated by graph 11, which shows the 
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development in the Brent spot price, freight rates on MEG/WEST and the BDI from 
2000 until 2010.   
 
The development in the oil price can be compared with the freight rates, the return on 
equity and the stock prices.  Dry bulk freight rates have high correlations with the 
Brent crude oil price, while tanker freight rates have low correlations (Appendix E, 
table 38).  Positive correlations are also found when stock prices and the oil price are 
compared, but the spread is smaller (Appendix E, table 39).  It is possible to conclude, 
with a majority of positive coefficients, that freight rates and stock prices tend to 
move in the same direction as the Brent crude spot price.   
 
The different regression analysis performed, including those used to control the 
results, indicate that the price on Brent crude oil affects the freight rates and stock 
prices, but not the debt-equity ratio, ROI and ROIC.  
 
 
Graph 11: Fluctuations in Brent crude oil spot price, tanker freight rate and BDI in per cent 
(Fearnleys and U.S. Energy Information Administration).  The graph uses the first observations in 2000 
as a basis to illustrate the development.   These observations are set to be 100 and the development is 
measured in per cent.  MEG/WEST and Brent crude oil have a weak correlation coefficient equal to 
0.082, while BDI and Brent crude oil have a coefficient equal to 0.698.  The correlation coefficient 
between BDI and MEG/WEST is 0.345.    
 
9.2.7. Return on equity 
Return on equity (ROE) measures the rate of return for the owner of a company.  This 
benchmark can be written as equation 15.   
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 !"# = !"#  !"#$%&  !"#$%  !"#!ℎ!"#ℎ!"#$%  !"#$%&  
Equation 15: The return on equity.   
 
Fluctuations in the return on equity can be illustrated by graph 12 as an annual 
average of ROE.  The dry bulk- and tanker companies’ average returns have a 
correlation coefficient equal to 79%.  Calculating an average rate of return for the 
entire period, as done in table 16, shows that dry bulk companies generated the 
highest rate of return.   
 
 
Graph 12: Fluctuations in the average return on equity (Datastream).  The dry bulk- and tanker 
companies had from 2000 until 2010 a correlation between their return on equity equal to 79%.   
 
	    
Table 16: Average return on equity between 2000 and 2010 (Datastream).  The table shows that, in 
average, the dry bulk companies have generated a higher rate of return than the tanker companies.   
 
By finding the correlation between freight rates and return on equity, the companies’ 
equity and the development in the shipping market could be compared.  This would 
indicate how close they have moved the last decade.  From Appendix E table 32 and 
33, showing the correlation coefficients between freight rates and the return on equity, 
both positive and negative correlations are found.  67% of the dry bulk coefficients 
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are positive, but a majority have values below 0.3.  This makes it possible to find a 
weak relation between the dry bulk rates and the return on equity, but the low values 
require a closer analysis in order to determine whether or not to accept the hypothesis. 
The tanker companies have a higher percentage of positive correlations, making it 
possible to see a clearer relation between the fluctuations in the tanker freight rates 
and the return on equity.   
 
The correlations between the return on equity and the Brent crude oil spot price have 
a diversified spread, making it difficult to state a relationship (Appendix E, table 40).  
Both the dry bulk- and tanker companies’ return on equity behave independently as 
the Brent spot price fluctuates.  In order to determine whether or not a to accept this 
hypothesis, a regression analysis should be performed.    
 
A multiple regression (Appendix F), with segment and company as dummies, gives 
high P-values to beta, the debt-equity ratio and the Brent spot price.  These findings 
indicate that beta, Brent and the debt-equity cannot be used to explain the return of 
equity.  The relation between ROE and the debt-equity ratio in this model is also 
found if they change positions and if ROE is added as an independent variable in the 
DebtEquity regression model.  A negative coefficient might be explained by the 
pecking order and its prediction of a negative relation between profitability and 
leverage (Fama and French, 2002).  Minitab has, as with the other regressions, 
removed variables with high correlations.  Of the 28 voyages involved in this 
analysis, five did not have a high correlation and were included.  Three of the five had 
significant P-values and affects the outcome.  Studying the dummy variables show 
mostly insignificant P-values, which implies that these companies cannot be 
explained by the model.  Values of R-Sq., F and P, found in table 17, indicate that the 
regression model is valid.  However, the part of hypothesis 7 related to ROE might 
not be completely confirmed, due to the spread in the P-values.   
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Table 17: Coefficient, standard error and P-value for the variables in the ROE regression model. 
 
9.2.8. Return on invested capital 
Return on invested capital measures how available capital is invested.  It can be 
calculated by equation 16.   
 !"#$ = !"#  !"#$%&  !"#$%  !"#!"#$%&$'  !"#$%"&= !"#$%  !"#  !"#$%&'()  !"#$%&!"#$%  !""#$" − !"#!$$  !"#ℎ − !"!  !"#$%$&#  !"#$%&'  !"##$%&  !"#$"!"%"&'   
Equation 16: The return on invested capital.   
 
The return on invested capital from 2000 and 2010 is illustrated by graph 13.  During 
this period, the two segments had a correlation in ROIC equal to 81%.  The main 
differences are to be found around 2001, 2004 and 2007.  In average, as calculated in 
table 18, the dry bulk- and tanker segment had ROIC equal to 17.13% and 12.44%.   
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Graph 13: Fluctuations in the average return on equity (Datastream).  The dry bulk- and tanker 
companies had from 2000 until 2010 a correlation between their return on invested capital equal to 
81%.   
 
 
Table 18: Average return on invested capital between 2000 and 2010 (Datastream).  The table 
shows that, in average, the dry bulk companies have generated a higher rate of return than the tanker 
companies. 
 
Finding the correlations between ROIC and the dry bulk freight rates, indicate the 
development in return compared to these rates.  As shown in Appendix E table 34, the 
values of the coefficients fluctuate.  Half of the observations are to be found between  
-0.2 and 0.2 and approximately 50% of all coefficients are positive.  Doing the same 
with the tanker freight rates gives 73% positive coefficients (Appendix E table 35), 
with 52% above 0.3.  These are more significant than those found among the dry bulk 
companies.  However, both segments should be examined more closely in order to try 
increasing the significance.  Correlation coefficients between Brent crude oil spot 
prices and the return on invested capital have, as the correlation between Brent and 
ROE, a large spread (Appendix E table 41).  This makes it difficult to prove a 
relation.   
 
The ROIC regression model (Appendix F) indicates the same tendency found in the 
ROE regression.  With quite similar R-Sq.-values, F-values and P-values, ROIC and 
ROE seem to be affected by the same independent variables.  This result is also 
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visible if ROIC is added as an independent variable in the DebtEquity regression 
model, and if the debt-equity ratio and ROIC switch positions in the ROIC model.  
The correlations found between the return on equity and return on invested capital 
support these results.  A negative D/E coefficient in the ROIC regression model imply 
a negative relation between the return on invested capital and the debt-equity ratio, 
which can be explained by the pecking order theory (Fama and French, 2002).  
 
	    
Table 19: Coefficient, standard error and P-value for the variables in the ROIC regression model. 
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9.3. Limitations 
 
All companies did not have data for the entire period, as some were founded and/or 
went public during the decade.  This, together with the most severe financial crisis 
since the late 1920s, might affect the analysis and give abnormal observations.   
 
Many of the correlation coefficients found where either too weak or too widely spread 
to decide whether to accept or reject some of the hypotheses.  The multiple regression 
models, with two dummy categories, were created with the purpose of giving more 
significant answers.  One way to increase the results even more would be to expand 
the time frame and/or the amount of companies.  The dummies used in the regression 
models can also create limitations, and different alternatives should be tested if the 
time frame and amount of companies are changed.  
 
An important limitation in this thesis is the collecting of detailed information about 
financial structures, e.g. the detailed use of different types of debt and bonds, as this is 
not shown on the balance sheet.  This made it difficult to examine the companies as 
originally planned.  
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10.	  Summary	  and	  conclusion	   
 
The purpose with this thesis was to study capital structure and relate it to the shipping 
industry.  I have done this by examine both financial- and market data, in an attempt 
to see how the financing changes as the market fluctuates.   
 
The results show that shipping companies do not have a clear solution to what is the 
best way of financing, given the market conditions.  However, some common features 
can be found.  Rauh and Sufi (2010) proved that companies with high market-to-book 
value tend to use less debt than those with high asset tangibility.  This can be found 
for some of the companies, although not many enough to confirm the hypothesis.  The 
D/E regression model indicates that financial behaviour is more complex than 
assumed by the pecking order.  Both the dry bulk- and tanker companies seem to 
prefer owning vessels instead of leasing, but tanker companies’ use leasing more 
frequently than dry bulk companies.  The significant DebtLevel variable in the Owned 
regression model suggest that the positive relation between debt and leasing, 
described by Ang and Peterson (1984) and Smith and Wakeman (1985), might be 
found in shipping.   
 
The use of debt, compared to equity, has been quite stable for tanker companies and 
decreased for dry bulk companies when data from 2000 is compared to 2010.  Dry 
bulk experienced a peak in the debt-equity ratio in 2001, while the tanker market 
peaked in 2003.  Both segments had a quite low and stable ratio from 2004.  This 
might indicate a change among preferred capital.   
 
ROE and ROIC are back to the levels they had in 2000.  This is a result of both the 
shipping cycle and the problems in the financial markets.   
 
It is difficult to predict the future in a volatile industry like shipping.  With the 
expected increase in size of the existing fleet, calmer seas will probably not be 
reached for some time.  This will also affect the financial alternatives, as few 
investors want to invest in a market with a troubled future.   
 
	  74	  
References 
 
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism.  The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (3), pp. 488-500. 
 
Ang, J. and Peterson, P. P. (1984) The Leasing Puzzle.  The Journal of Finance,  
39 (4), pp. 1055-1065. 
 
Barclay, M. J. and Smith, C. W. (2005) The Capital Structure Puzzle: The Evidence 
Revisited.  Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 17 (1), pp. 8-17.   
 
Birkeland d.y., S. and Eide, T. (2000) Lønnsomheten i norsk skipsfart.  SNF Working 
paper nr. 63/00. 
 
Black, F. and Scholes, M. (1973) The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities.  
The Journal of Political Economy, 81 (3), pp. 637-654. 
 
Bradley, M., Jarrell, G. A. and Kim, E. H. (1984) On the Existence of an Optimal 
Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence.  The Journal of Finance, 39 (3), pp. 857-878. 
 
Brealey, R. A., Myers, S. C. and Allen, F. (2008) Principles of Corporate Finance – 
international edition.  9th edition.  New York, McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
 
Brennan, M (1970) Taxes, Market Valuation and Corporate Financial Policy.  
National Tax Journal, 23, p. 417–427. 
 
Brennan, M. J. and Schwartz, E. S. (1980) Analyzing Convertible Bonds.  Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 15 (4), pp. 907-929. 
 
Brennan, M. J. and Schwartz, E. S. (1984) Optimal Financial Policy and Firm 
Valuation.  The Journal of Finance, 39 (3), pp. 593-607. 
 
	   75	  
Charles R. Weber Company, Inc. (March 1, 2011) Tanker Time Charter Rates 
[Internet].  Available from:  
<http://www.crweber.com/> 
[Accessed March 1, 2011]. 
 
Cullinane, K. (2005) Editorial: key themes in shipping economics research.  In: 
Cullinane, K. ed. (2005) Research in transportation economics, Vol 12, Shipping 
economics.  Amsterdam, Elsevier. 
 
Datastream Advance 4.0: Thomson Financial Limited. 
 
Drobetz, W., Schilling, D. and Tegtmeier, L. (2010) Common Risk Factors in the 
Returns of Shipping Stocks.  Maritime Policy & Management, 37, pp. 93‐120. 
 
Eckbo, B. E., Giammarino R. M. and Heinkel R. L. (1990) Asymmetric Information 
and the Medium of Exchange in Takeovers, Theory and Test.  The Review of 
Financial Studies, 3 (4), pp. 651-675. 
 
Exxon Mobil, The Valdez Oil Spill [Internet].  Available from: 
<http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/about_issues_valdez.aspx> 
[Accessed May 23, 2011]. 
 
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (1998) Taxes, Financing Decisions, and Firm Value.   
The Journal of Finance, 53 (3), pp. 819-843. 
 
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (2002) Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order 
Predictions About Dividends and Debt.  The Review of Financial Studies, 15 (1),  
pp. 1-33. 
 
Fearnleys (May 19, 2011) Fearnleys Weekly [Internet].  Available from: 
<http://www.fearnleys.com/index.gan?id=190&subid=0&weeklysection=1&weekly=
1&action=&sendto=> 
[Accessed May 19, 2011]. 
	  76	  
Fearnresearch (May, 2004) Dry bulk market report, April 2004 [Internet]. Available 
from:  
<www.fearnleys.com/asset/54/1/54_1.pdf> 
[Accessed April 5, 2011]. 
 
Fearnresearch (May 2011) Bulk fleet update, April 2011.   
 
Federal Reserve (March 14, 2011) Data Download [Internet].  Available from: 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/> 
[Accessed March 15, 2011]. 
 
Fischer, E. O., Heinkel, R. and Zechner, J. (1989) Capital Structure Choice: Theory 
and Tests.  The Journal of Finance, 44 (1), pp. 19-40. 
 
Frank, M. Z. and Goyal, V. K. (2007) Trade-off and Pecking Order Theories of Debt. 
In: Eckbo, B. E, ed. (2008) Handbook of Corporate Finance, Empirical Corporate 
Finance, Vol. 2.  Amsterdam, Elsevier, pp. 135-202. 
 
Gilson, S. C. and Warner, J. B. (1997) Junk Bonds, Bank Debt, and Financing 
Corporate Growth.  Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 98-037. 
 
Goedhart, M. H., Koller, T and Rehm, W (2006) Making capital structure support 
strategy.  McKinsey on Finance, 18, pp. 12-17.   
 
Goldstein, R., Ju, N. and Leland, H. (2001) An EBIT-Based Model of Dynamic 
Capital Structure.  The Journal of Business, 74 (4), pp. 483-512. 
 
Goulielmos, A. M. (2009) Risk analysis of the Aframax freight market and of its new 
building and second hand prices, 1976–2008 and 1984–2008.  International Journal 
of Shipping and Transportation, 1 (1), pp.74-97.   
 
Grenadier, S.R. (1996) Leasing and credit risk.  Journal of Financial Economics,  
42 (3), pp. 333-364. 
 
	   77	  
ICAP, About the Group [Internet].  Available from:  
<http://www.icap.com/> 
[Accessed April 24, 2011]. 
 
James, F. C. (1929) Financing the Merchant Shipping Industry.  The Journal of 
Business of the University of Chicago, 2 (2), pp. 204-216. 
 
Jensen M. C. and Meckling W. H. (1976) Theory of the firm, managerial behaviour, 
agency costs and ownership structure.  Journal of Financial Economics, 3,  
pp. 305-360. 
 
Kaminska, I (2009) Prepare for a junk-bond deluge in shipping.  Financial Times 
Alphaville, November 11, 2009 [Internet].  Available from: 
<http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2009/11/11/82736/prepare-for-a-junk-bond-deluge-in-
shipping/> 
[Accessed April 26, 2011]. 
 
Kane, A., Marcus, A. J. and McDonald, R. L. (1984) How Big is the Tax Advantage to 
Debt?  The Journal of Finance, 39 (3), pp. 841-853. 
 
Kavussanos, M. G. and Marcoulis, S. N. (2005) Cross-industry comparisons of the 
behaviour of stock returns in shipping, transportation and other industries.  In: 
Cullinane, K. ed. (2005) Research in transportation economics, Vol 12, Shipping 
economics.  Amsterdam, Elsevier. 
 
Keller, G. (2005) Statistics for management and economics – international edition.   
7th edition. London, Thomson.   
 
Leary, M.T., and Roberts, M.R. (2005) Do Firms Rebalance Their Capital 
Structures?  The Journal of Finance, 60 (6), pp. 2575–2619. 
 
Lewis, M. (2006) Liar’s Poker.  London, Hodder & Stoughton General Division. 
 
	  78	  
Liang, G., Liu, C., Lin, W. and Yeh, C. (2006) A Data Envelopment Analysis of 
Shipping Industry Bond Ratings.  Tamkang Journal of Science and Engineering, 9 (4), 
pp. 403–408. 
 
Miller, M. H. (1977) Debt and Taxes.  The Journal of Finance, 32 (2), pp. 261-275. 
Miller, M. H. and Scholes, M. S. (1978) Dividends and taxes.  Journal of Financial 
Economics, 6 (4), pp. 333–364. 
 
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. H. (1958) The cost of capital, corporation finance and 
the theory of investment.  The American Economic Review, 48 (3), pp. 261-297. 
 
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. H. (1963) Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of 
Capital: A Correction.  The American Economic Review, 53 (3), pp. 433-443. 
 
Myers, S. C. (1977) Determinants of Corporate Borrowing.  Journal of Financial 
Economics, Volume 5 (2), pp. 147-175. 
 
Myers, S C. (1984) Capital Structure Puzzle.  The Journal of Finance, 39 (3),  
pp. 575-592. 
 
Myers, S. C. (2002) Financing of Corporations.  In: Constantinides, G.M., Harris, M. 
and Stulz, R.M., ed. (2003) Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Corporate 
Finance, Vol 1A.  Amsterdam, Elsevier, pp. 215-253. 
 
Myers, S. C. and Majluf, N. S. (1984) Corporate financing and investment decisions 
when firms have information the investors do not have.  The Journal of Financial 
Economics, 13 (2), pp. 187-221. 
 
Neste Oil, Types of crude oil [Internet].  Available from: 
<http://www.nesteoil.com/default.asp?path=1,41,537,5196,5199> 
[Accessed April 4, 2011]. 
 
 
	   79	  
Norwegian Ministry of Finance (February 4, 2007) Rederibeskatning [Internet].  
Available from: 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fin/tema/skatter_og_avgifter/bedriftsbeskatning/re
deribeskatning.html?id=447324> 
[Accessed: March 3, 2011]. 
 
Oslo Børs (June 6, 2011) OSLO Shipping Index [Internet].  Available from:  
<http://www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/markedsaktivitet/stockIndexOverview?newt__ticker
=OSLSHX> 
 [Accessed June 6, 2011]. 
 
PWC (2009) Choosing a profitable course around the globe, corporate taxation of the 
global shipping industry [Internet].  Available from: 
<http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/transportation-logistics/corporate-taxation/ corporate-
taxation-global-shipping-industry.jhtml> 
[Accessed May 4, 2011]. 
 
Rauh, J. D. and Sufi, A. (2010) Capital Structure and Debt Structure.  The review of 
financial studies, 23 (12), pp. 4242-4280.   
 
RS Platou (May 3, 2011) Monthly report, April 2011 [Internet].  Available from: 
<http://www.platou.com/dnn_site/Shipping/Tankers.aspx> 
[Accessed May 3, 2011]. 
 
Smith, C. W. and Wakeman, L.M. (1985) Determinants of Corporate Leasing Policy.  
The Journal of Finance, 40 (3), pp. 895-908. 
 
Stopford, M. (2009) Maritime economics.  3rd edition.  London, Routledge. 
 
University of Cincinnati, College of Law (2009) Rule 144A - Private Resales of 
Securities to Institutions [Internet].  Available from: 
<http://taft.law.uc.edu/CCL/33ActRls/rule144A.html> 
[Accessed May 11, 2011] 
 
	  80	  
U.S. Energy Information Administration (March 16, 2011) Crude oil prices [Internet].  
Available from: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm> 
[Accessed March 26, 2011] 
 
U.S. Security and Exchange Commission (2008) Rule 144: Selling Restricted and 
Control Securities [Internet].  Available from: 
<http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/rule144.htm> 
[Accessed May 11, 2011]. 
 
Worldscale Association (January 1, 2011) New worldwide tanker nominal freight 
scale [Internet].  Available from:  
<http://www.worldscale.co.uk/> 
[Accessed January 30, 2011]. 
 
Wijnolst, N. and Wergeland, T. (2009) Analysis of shipping markets.  Shipping 
innovation.  Amsterdam, ISO Press. 
	   81	  
Appendix A – Abbreviations 
 
 
 
   
 
 
!""#$%&'(&)* +,-.'*'(&)*
/01 /'.(&230#431*5$,
0$. 0$.&%$#4
06( 0$'536$&78(3()**'7$
19: 1*&(&'.3-;".&23)<<$#&*7
=1/:> =)*5)*31*($#"'*?3:<<$#$53>'($
=@A =&B;$<&$53*'(;#'.37'C
=9A =&B;$<&$53-$(#).$;D37'C
@!E0!F @'(&)*'.3!CC)2&'(&)*3)<3E$2;#&(&$C30$'.$#C3!;()D'($53F;)('(&)*C
@GE+ @$63G)#?3E()2?3+,28'*7$3
:E+ :C.)3E()2?3+,28'*7$
:E=EHI :C.)3E8&--&*731*5$,
>:+ >$(;#*3)*3$B;&(4
>:1J >$(;#*3)*3&*%$C($532'-&('.
E+J KLEL3Security and Exchange Commission
E).53<)#35$D)L E).53<)#35$D).&(&)*3
E9: E$2)*5'#43-;".&23)<<$#&*7
MJ+ M&D$328'#($#3$B;&%'.$*(
K=JJ K.(#'3.'#7$32#;5$32'##&$#
N=JJ N$#43.'#7$32#;5$32'##&$#
OE O)#.53E2'.$
OM1 O$C(3M$,'C31*($#D$5&'($
!""#$%&'(&)*+
	  82	  
Appendix B – Supply, demand and utilization rates 
 
 
Graph 14: Supply, demand and utilization rates in the tanker market (RS Platou Monthly report, 
April 2011). 
 
 
 
Graph 15: Supply, demand and utilization rates in the Dry bulk market (RS Platou Monthly report, 
April 2011).  
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Appendix C – Shipping companies 
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Appendix D – Common trade routes  
 
 
Common trade routes (Fearnleys weekly). 
 
 
 
 
CARIBS/USG Caribbean to US Gulf
MEG/JPN Middle East Gulf to Japan
MEG/SPORE Middle East Gulf to Singapore
MEG/WEST Middle East Gulf to US Gulf, Canada and Europe
NAF/EUROMED North Africa to Europe
Sidi Kerir/W MED Sidi Kerir to West Mediterranean
UK/CONT United Kingdom to European continent
WAF/USAC West Africa to US Atlantic coast
WAF/USG West Africa to US Gulf
Baltic T/A Baltic Sea across the Atlantic
Caribs/USNH Caribbean to United States north of Cape Hatteras (North Carolina)
MEG/Japan Middle East Gulf to Japan
Singapore/Japan Singapore to Japan
UK Med/States United Kingdom, Mediterranean to United States
Atlantic RV Atlantic Round Voyage
Murmansk / ARA Murmansk to Antwerp, Rotterdam, Amsterdam
Murmansk / L.pool Murmansk to Liverpool
Pacific RV Pacific round-voyage
Richards Bay/R.dam South Africa to Rotterdam
TCT Cont/Far East Time charter trip European continent to Far East
TCT F. East Time charter trip in Far East
TCT F. East RV Time charter trip in Far East, Round Voyage
Transatlantic RV Transatlantic round-voyage 
Tubarao/R.dam Brazil to Rotterdam
Common trade routes
Crude oil
Refined products
Dry bulk
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Appendix E – Correlation 
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Table 25: Hypothesis 3, Correlation between average owned vessels and freight rates (Datastream 
and Fearnleys). 
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Table 30: Hypothesis 5, Correlation between freight rates and OSLSHX (Fearnleys and Oslo Stock 
Exchange). 
 
 
Table 31: Hypothesis 6, Correlation between freight rates and interest rate (Fearnleys and U.S. 
Federal Reserve) 
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Table 38: Hypothesis 9, Correlation between Brent crude oil spot price and freight rates 
(Fearnleys and U.S. Energy Information Administration). 
 
 
Table 39: Hypothesis 9, Correlation between Brent crude oil spot price and stock prices 
(Datastream and U.S. Energy Information Administration). 
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Table 40: Hypothesis 9, Correlation between Brent crude oil spot price and return on equity 
(Datastream and U.S. Energy Information Administration). 
 
 
Table 41: Hypothesis 9, Correlation between Brent crude oil spot price and return on invested 
capital (Datastream and U.S. Energy Information Administration). 
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Appendix F – Regression models 
 
 
Table 42: Validation of the regression models.   
 
 
Hypothesis 1 – DebtLevel regression model: 
 
DebtLevel = 0.293 - 0.00100 [MarketBook] + 0.112 [AssetTangibility] + 0.0086 [BLE]  
- 0.212 [DNORD] - 0.0085 [DSX] - 0.209 [DRYS] - 0.186 [ESEA] - 0.0492 [EXM] 
- 0.0866 [2601] - 0.0643 [FREE] + 0.0215 [GOGL] - 0.0548 [JIN]  
- 0.0226 [WILS] - 0.129 [CCOR B] - 0.0100 [DHT] - 0.0025 [EURN]  
- 0.0353 [FRO] - 0.0866 [GMR] - 0.0509 [500620] - 0.107 [VLCCF]  
- 0.283 [NAT] - 0.0579 [OSG] + 0.352 [SFL] - 0.0534 [TK] - 0.0107 [TRMD] 
 
S = 0.0740856   R-Sq = 85.1%   R-Sq(adj) = 83.0% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source           DF       SS       MS      F      P 
Regression       25  5.37781  0.21511  39.19  0.000 
Residual Error  171  0.93856  0.00549 
Total           196  6.31637 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 – D/E regression model: 
 
D/E = 1.59 + 0.00832 [MarketBook] + 0.876 [AssetTangibility] - 0.000488 [StockPrice]  
- 1.90 [Owned] + 0.000007 [TCT Cont/Far East (172’ dwt)]  
- 0.071 [Tubarao/R.dam (iron ore)] + 0.0177 [Richard Bay/R.dam]  
+ 0.000007 [Transatlantic RV] - 0.00064 [UKC-Med/States] + 0.00035 [Caribs/USNH]  
+ 0.084 [DryBulk] + 0.468 [BLE] - 0.252 [DNORD] - 0.065 [DSX] - 0.007 [DRYS]  
- 0.174 [ESEA] + 0.016 [EXM] - 0.191 [FREE] - 0.493 [GOGL] - 0.069 [CCOR B]  
+ 0.043 [DHT] - 0.123 [EURN] + 0.215 [FRO] + 0.038 [GMR] - 0.129 [VLCCF]  
- 0.313 [NAT] + 0.066 [OSG] + 1.63 [SFL] - 0.061 [TK] + 0.116 [TRMD] 
 
S = 0.255438   R-Sq = 96.5%   R-Sq(adj) = 95.5% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source           DF        SS      MS      F      P 
Regression       30  194.5001  6.4833  99.36  0.000 
Residual Error  109    7.1121  0.0652 
Total           139  201.6122 
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Hypothesis 4 – Beta regression model: 
 
Beta = - 0.51 + 0.062 [D/E] - 0.0157 [MarketBook]  
- 0.000103 [TCT Cont/Far East (172’ dwt)] + 0.724 [Tubarao/R.dam (iron ore)]  
- 0.0594 [Richard Bay/R.dam] - 0.000074 [Transatlantic RV]  
- 0.00956 [UKC-Med/States] + 0.0103 [Caribs/USNH] - 1.15 [DryBulk] + 1.08 [BLE] 
+ 1.30 [DNORD] + 1.30 [DSX] + 2.92 [DRYS] - 1.52 [ESEA] + 1.37 [EXM]  
+ 1.47 [2601] + 1.47 [FREE] + 1.66 [GOGL] + 1.31 [JIN] - 0.197 [CCOR B]  
- 0.434 [DHT] - 0.484 [EURN] + 0.120 [FRO] + 0.055 [GMR] - 0.053 [500620]  
– 0.046 [VLCCF] - 0.453 [NAT] + 0.163 [OSG] + 0.224 [SFL] - 0.108 [TK]  
+ 0.275 [TRMD] 
 
S = 1.02454   R-Sq = 39.5%   R-Sq(adj) = 26.3% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source           DF       SS     MS     F      P 
Regression       31   97.365  3.141  2.99  0.000 
Residual Error  142  149.053  1.050 
Total           173  246.419 
 
 
Hypothesis 5 – StockPrice regression model: 
 
StockPrice = 1.0 - 0.596 [OSLSHX] + 0.948 [Brent]  
+ 0.000746 [TCT Cont/Far East (172’ dwt)]  
- 3.03 [Tubarao/R.dam (iron ore)] + 0.100 [UKC-Med/States]  
- 2.4 [DryBulk] - 6.9 [BLE] + 228 [DNORD] - 4.9 [DSX] + 3.1 [DRYS]  
- 17.6 [ESEA] - 1.9 [EXM] + 12.6 [2601] - 4.8 [FREE] - 7.6 [GOGL] 
+ 7.6 [JIN] + 10.5 [CCOR B] - 14.0 [DHT] - 2.1 [EURN] + 12.1 [FRO] 
- 1.7 [GMR] + 240 [500620] + 0.3 [VLCCF] + 11.5 [NAT] + 31.9 [OSG] 
- 2.5 [SFL] + 15.3 [TK] + 0.9 [TRMD] 
 
S = 44.1324   R-Sq = 75.3%   R-Sq(adj) = 68.9% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source           DF      SS     MS      F      P 
Regression       28  640908  22890  11.75  0.000 
Residual Error  108  210348   1948 
Total           136  851257 
 
 
Hypothesis 6 – FreightRate regression model: 
 
FreightRate = - 14340 + 70154 [InterestRate] + 212 [Brent] + 4521 [DryBulk]  
+ 59825 [TCT Cont/Far East (172’ dwt)]  
- 4323 [Tubarao/R.dam (iron ore)] - 4318 [Richard Bay/R.dam]  
+ 22342 [Transatlantic RV] + 26107 [TCT Cont/F.East] 
+ 16896 [TCT F.East/Cont] + 20030 [TCT F.East RV] - 7718 [Murmansk/ARA] 
- 7717 [Murmansk/L.Pool] + 18078 [Atlantic RV] + 15554 [Pacific RV]  
+ 22265 [TCT Cont/F.East (Handysize)] + 241 [MEG/WEST] + 276 [MEG/JPN] 
- 1250 [MEG/SPORE] + 279 WAF/USG] + 315 [WAF/USAC]  
- 788 [Sidi Kerir/W Med] + 345 [NAF/EUROMED] + 330 [UK/CONT]  
+ 371 [CARIBS/USG] - 4363 [MEG/Japan (75’ dwt)]  
+ 390 [MEG/Japan (55’ dwt)]+ 444 [MEG/Japan (30’ dwt)]  
+ 421 [Singapore/Japan] - 4346 [Baltic T/A] + 414 [UKC-Med/States] 
 
S = 13419.4   R-Sq = 60.1%   R-Sq(adj) = 60.0% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source             DF           SS           MS       F      P 
Regression         30  3.94766E+12  1.31589E+11  730.72  0.000 
Residual Error  14558  2.62162E+12    180081122 
Total           14588  6.56928E+12 
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Hypothesis 7 – ROE and ROIC regression models: 
 
ROE = 24.3 - 0.64 [Beta] - 0.209 [D/E] - 0.125 [Brent]  
- 0.000049 [TCT Cont/Far East (172’ dwt)] - 3.61 [Tubarao/R.dam (iron ore)]  
+ 3.04 [Richard Bay/R.dam] - 0.263 [UKC-Med/States] + 0.286 [Caribs/USNH]  
- 2.2 [DryBulk] + 5.0 [BLE] + 28.1 [DNORD] + 2.1 [DSX] - 3.0 [DRYS] - 9.3 [ESEA]  
+ 11.6 [EXM] - 12.6 [2601] - 12.9 [FREE] + 78.5 [GOGL] + 12.5 [JIN]  
- 12.9 [CCOR B] + 4.3 [DHT] - 3.1 [EURN] + 40.1 [FRO] - 13.4 [GMR] + 9.0 [500620] 
+ 2.1 [VLCCF] - 5.4 [NAT] - 5.5 [OSG] + 11.2 [SFL] - 8.8 [TK] + 11.5 [TRMD] 
 
S = 22.1810   R-Sq = 53.5%   R-Sq(adj) = 43.4% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source           DF        SS      MS     F      P 
Regression       31   80833.8  2607.5  5.30  0.000 
Residual Error  143   70355.3   492.0 
Total           174  151189.1 
 
ROIC = 11.8 - 0.622 [Beta] - 0.333 [D/E] - 0.0506 [Brent]  
+ 0.000080 [TCT Cont/Far East (172’ dwt)] - 1.76 [Tubarao/R.dam (iron ore)]  
+ 1.05 [Richard Bay/R.dam] - 0.130 [UKC-Med/States] + 0.163 [Caribs/USNH]  
- 1.53 [DryBulk] + 4.78 [BLE] + 26.2 [DNORD] + 6.89 [DSX] + 0.62 [DRYS]  
- 3.40 [ESEA] + 9.22 [EXM] - 7.07 [2601] - 5.07 [FREE] + 21.9 [GOGL]  
+ 8.14 [JIN] - 5.95 [CCOR B] - 0.62 [DHT] - 0.47 [EURN] + 3.79 [FRO]  
- 3.06 [GMR] + 6.09 [500620] + 4.35 [VLCCF] + 1.08 [NAT] - 1.93 [OSG]  
+ 0.65 [SFL] - 2.21 [TK] + 8.48 [TRMD] 
 
S = 9.73446   R-Sq = 55.7%   R-Sq(adj) = 45.6% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source           DF        SS      MS     F      P 
Regression       31  16209.35  522.88  5.52  0.000 
Residual Error  136  12887.32   94.76 
Total           167  29096.66 
